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Mr. Chairman, ranking member Clarke, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate 
the opportunity to testify today on the benefits for small business of regulations that protect 
public health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment.   
I could not agree more with the Subcommittee’s overarching mission: strengthening the 
role of small business in repairing an economy ruined by rampant speculation and the excessive 
greed of financial institutions that Attorney General Eric Holder has embarrassingly implied are 
too big to prosecute.  Rather than take an honest look at how weak regulation allowed Wall 
Street to engineer the 2008 crash, big business uses small business as a kind of human shield, 
conflating the distinctly different needs in the two sectors and pushing for deregulation that could 
further endanger the economy and public health.   
A case in point is the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Advocacy, which 
has consciously diverted its limited, taxpayer-funded resources away from helping truly small 
business understand and comply with regulatory requirement toward pursuing the complaint du 
jour of the very large companies that call the shots at the American Chemistry Council, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  These activities 
raise the disturbing prospect that the Office of Advocacy has broken the law.  In fact, I hope 
that the evidence I put before you today will motivate you to ask the Government Accountability 
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Office (GAO) to investigate the SBA Office of Advocacy regarding its compliance with laws 
that (1) bar federally funded agencies from lobbying Congress and (2) require it to conduct its 
affairs in the sunshine.  We hope you will also ask GAO to investigate how the Office of 
Advocacy ensures that its intervention in individual rulemakings genuinely advance the interests 
of truly small businesses.  From what we can tell, it routinely intervenes in rulemakings with 
only tangential effects on its constituency.    
I am a law professor at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law and the 
President of the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) (http://www.progressivereform.org/).  
Founded in 2002, CPR is a network of sixty scholars across the nation dedicated to protecting 
health, safety, and the environment through analysis and commentary.  We have a small 
professional staff funded by foundations.   I joined academia mid-career, after working for the 
Federal Trade Commission for seven years and the House Energy and Commerce Committee for 
five years.  For seven years, I served as the lawyer for small, publicly-owned electric systems 
that have much in common with the businesses under your jurisdiction.  My work on 
environmental regulation includes four books, and over thirty articles (as author or co-author).   
My most recent book, published by the University of Chicago Press, is The People's Agents and 
the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests, Government, and Threats to Health, 
Safety, and the Environment, co-authored with Professor Sidney Shapiro of Wake Forest 
University’s School of Law, which comprehensively analyzes the state of the regulatory system 
that protects public health, worker and consumer safety, and natural resources, and concludes 
that these agencies are under-funded, lack adequate legal authority, and consistently are 
undermined by political pressure motivated by special interests in the private sector.  I have 
served as consultant to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and testified before 
Congress many times.   
My testimony today makes four points: 
Small business deserves assistance regarding compliance with regulatory requirements 
and the SBA Office of Advocacy ought to provide this assistance rather than operating 
as an institutionalized opponent of regulations targeted by its big business cronies. 
Two recent reports by CPR and the Center for Effective Government reveal that the 
Office of Advocacy systematically ignores the needs of small business and instead 
operates, largely in secret, as a loyal foot soldier in the big business campaign against 
regulation. 
Regulation is vital to the quality of life we take for granted in America, saving lives, 
preserving health, and safeguarding the natural environment for our children. 
If anything, our regulatory system is dangerously weak, and Congress should focus on 
reviving it rather than eroding public protections. 
The Disgraceful Track Record of the SBA Office of Advocacy 
 As you are no doubt aware, Congress established the SBA in 1953 to safeguard the 
interests of small business in an economy buffeted by World War II and the Korean War.  
Legitimate concerns about the competitive disadvantages that small business faced during 
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wartime motivated the establishment of broadly based effort to ensure small business access to 
federal procurement contracts and to conduct specialized outreach to women, people of color, 
and veterans.    
The SBA Office of Advocacy was created in 1976 to represent small business before 
federal agencies.  To the extent that the Office of Advocacy’s role in the rulemaking process is to 
ensure that the concerns of truly small businesses are raised before agencies, this limited mission 
makes sense.  After all, truly small businesses don’t have the resources to represent their interests 
in Washington.  And those interests are often quite distinct from the big business with which 
they compete.   
Unfortunately, the Office of Advocacy has strayed far from this mission, as explained in 
two particularly shocking investigative reports I have attached to my testimony.  The reports 
reveal that the SBA Office of Advocacy has systematically consorted with big business to pursue 
an agenda of undercutting health, safety and environmental agencies without considering at any 
point whether the way its staff spend their time confers any benefit on small business.  The 
Office of Advocacy succeeds only in echoing the complaints voiced by well-heeled lobbyists 
representing the wealthiest companies and most powerful trade groups in the country.   
Meanwhile, the legitimate concerns of truly small businesses continue to be drowned out. 
The first report, authored by the Center for Effective Government (CEG), describes how 
the Office of Advocacy hosts regular “Environmental Roundtables” that are attended by trade 
association representatives and lobbyists.  The meetings are held at law firms that represent 
organizations like the American Chemistry Council, and feature presentations by lobbyists and 
lawyers who represent Fortune 100 companies.  They occur behind closed doors and their 
agendas, attendance lists, and minutes are not published.  Nevertheless, the roundtables result in 
positions that become the Office of Advocacy’s policy positions.   
 
Alerted by the CEG’s report, environmental organization representatives attempted to 
participate in a roundtable, but were told that they could listen to the discussion but were not 
allowed to speak.  (See Richard Denison, Environmental Defense Fund, “A mission corrupted: 
Your tax dollars pay for ACC to coach big industry on how to undercut EPA’s IRIS program,” 
http://blogs.edf.org/nanotechnology/2013/03/05/a-mission-corrupted-your-tax-dollars-pay-for-
acc-to-coach-big-industry-on-how-to-undercut-epas-iris-program/)  The roundtable consisted of 
presentations by Nancy Beck, a former White House Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) staffer who now works for the American Chemistry Council, and Robert 
Fensterheim, a former American Petroleum Industry staffer who now works at the RegNet/IRIS 
Forum, an industry group dedicated to undermining EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System 
(IRIS).   
 
The IRIS program compiles toxicological profiles of chemicals sold in large quantities in 
commerce, or otherwise threatening public health and the environment.  Its profiles do not have 
regulatory effect, although large chemical manufacturers are very sensitive to their potential to 
reveal a chemical’s toxicity.  Given all the decisions that affect small business today, it is 
mystifying why the chemical industry’s campaign against IRIS implicates the interests of more 
than a tiny handful of small businesses and, in fact, the CEG report finds no evidence that the 
Office of Advocacy received any request or comment from its ostensible constituency before 
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pursuing these issues.  As the CEG report explains, these activities, especially the sponsorship of 
the secretive roundtables, appear to violate the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).  
 
Correspondence received in response to a CEG Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request reveals that the SBA Office of Advocacy played a leading role in the American 
Chemistry Council’s crusade to halt the Department of Health and Human Service’s National 
Toxicology Program’s efforts to list chemicals as “known” or “probable” carcinogens, in 
probable violation of the Anti-Lobbying Act and other lobbying restrictions.  Once again, there is 
no evidence that the Office of Advocacy consulted with any small businesses in emphasizing 
these issues. 
 
The Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) report, released in tandem with the CEG’s 
investigative findings, found that the Office of Advocacy defines “small” businesses as any oil 
refinery that has up to 1,500 employees and any chemical plant that has up to 1,000 employees.  
This strange approach allows it to push for preferential regulatory treatment for relatively large 
firms that do not conform to any common sense understanding of what a “small business” is.  
This approach further obscures its efforts to win approval from big business in regulatory battles 
that have at best a marginal impact on small business interests.  As just one example, CPR 
reports on the Office of Advocacy’s enthusiastic participation in a rulemaking designed to reduce 
emissions of hazardous air pollutants such as arsenic, lead, and formaldehyde from coal-fired 
power plants.  The Office of Advocacy argued to the EPA that the rule should be cut back to 
cover only mercury emissions.  Its arguments closely tracked those made in a 200-page 
submission from the Southern Company, the fourth largest utility in the country. 
 
CPR’s report makes a crucial observation with regard to the Office of Advocacy’s 
aggressive deregulatory efforts:  by taking consistently hostile stances to health and safety 
rulemaking proposals, it sacrifices any opportunity to work with the agencies in an effort to 
mitigate the impact of the proposals on truly small businesses.  We understand the reasons for 
this approach, and they aren’t pretty.  Rewriting the comments prepared by big law firms for 
even bigger companies is far easier than rolling up your sleeves and working with agency 
officials to design innovative compliance alternatives. 
 
The report recommends that the Office of Advocacy restore its focus on helping truly 
small businesses—that is, those firms with 20 or fewer employees.  Second, it recommends a 
new mission for the Office of Advocacy:  promoting win-win regulatory solutions that help small 
businesses achieve protective regulatory standards without undermining their ability to compete 
with larger firms. 
 
The Benefits of Regulation 
 
Self-righteous crusaders against regulation have become accustomed to telling only half 
the story to the American people:  they pretend that exaggerated regulatory costs are the only 
result of the system, and ignore its considerable benefits.  Conversely, they suggest that if we 
dismantled the regulatory system, we would suffer no negative consequences and instead reap a 
windfall in saved money.  This devious approach is like setting out to balance a family budget, 
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stockpiling all the available money (pay checks, investments, or social security), and ignoring 
whatever you are able to buy (a place to live, leisure pursuits, or a college education). 
 What does it mean to leave the benefits side of the ledger blank?  Because the benefits of 
regulation are spread throughout the population, to every man, woman, and child in America—
regardless of class, race, background, or ethnicity—this myopic focus on the costs to regulatory 
industries raises the question of which group of citizens is more important—stockholders and 
brokers or everyday people who need clean air and water, safe workplaces and products, and 
financial and health care systems free of price gouging and other forms of fraud.  Should the 
second group risk grave harm so that the first group can maximize profits, or is there a better 
way? 
Just ask anyone whose life was saved by a seat belt, whose children escaped brain 
damage because the EPA took lead out of gas, who turns on the faucet knowing the water will be 
clean, who takes drugs for a chronic illness confident the medicine will make them better, who 
avoided having their hand mangled in machinery on the job because an emergency switch was 
there to cut off the motor, who has taken their kids on a trip to a heritage national park to see a 
bald eagle that was saved from the brink of extinction—the list goes on and on.   
The simple fact is that people need to be healthy enough to go to work and school.  To 
use the example of the benefits achieved by the EPA, the agency that has served as the poster 
child for supposed regulatory excess:  in 2010, clean air rules saved 164,300 adult lives.  By 
2020, they will save 237,000 lives annually.  These rules save 13 million days of work loss due 
to pollution-related illnesses like asthma, and 3.2 million days of school loss.  By 2020, they will 
save 17 million work loss days and 5.4 million school loss days.  The economic value of Clean 
Air Act regulatory controls are estimated to be $2 trillion annually by 2020, dwarfing $65 billion 
in compliance costs.1 
Previous Congresses did not pass the Clean Air and Water Acts, drug and food safety 
laws, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act simply to annoy industry.  You took action so 
that this country does not regress to a time when our rivers caught fire, our cars exploded on rear 
impact, ours workers contracted liver cancer from breathing in benzene, and the industrial zones 
of our cities and towns were smothered under a blanket of chemical haze.  The legacy of 
regulation is not economic ruin, but the possibility that our grandchildren will be better off than 
their parents’ generation. 
 
Revitalizing Regulation 
 
A series of catastrophic regulatory failures have focused attention on the troubled 
condition of regulatory agencies assigned to protect public health, worker and consumer safety, 
and the environment.  The destructive convergence of funding shortfalls (many agency budgets 
have stagnated or declined while the size of their has grown), political attacks from Congress and 
even the White House, and outmoded legal authority (decades-old statutes that only allow for 
miniscule penalties for egregious worker safety violations, for instance) have set the stage for 
ineffective enforcement and unsupervised industry self-regulation.  From the Deepwater Horizon 
                                                          
1 See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 (Mar. 
2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/sect812/feb11/fullreport.pdf. 
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spill in the Gulf of Mexico that killed eleven and caused grave environmental and economic 
damage, to the worst mining disaster in 40 years at the Big Branch mine in West Virginia with a 
death toll of 29, the signs of regulatory dysfunction abound.  Peanut paste tainted by salmonella, 
glasses imprinted with the Shrek logo contaminated by cadmium and sold at McDonald’s, Code 
Red smog days when parents are warned to keep their children indoors, the Vioxx recall—at the 
bottom of each well-publicized event is an agency unable to do its job and a company that could 
not be relied upon to put the public interest first.   
Consider the example of compounding pharmacies left virtually unregulated by state 
pharmacy boards and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  A compounding pharmacy in 
Massachusetts sold drugs contaminated with meningitis to clinics and hospitals nationwide.  The 
bad medicine has killed 48 and sickened 666, shaking public confidence to its core.  In a rare 
display of honesty, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg told the Reuters news service: “Over 
the years, there has been substantial debate within Congress about the appropriate amount of 
FDA oversight and regulation of compounding pharmacies.  But unfortunately, there has been a 
lack of consensus and many challenges from industry.”  And David Kessler, who served as FDA 
Commissioner during the Clinton Administration, speculated that the deeply discordant tensions 
of the presidential election affected the FDA’s performance: “Everyone is closed down right 
now,” he said. “People are being very careful. No one wants to make a mistake.”  Compounding 
pharmacies make 40 percent of the injectable drugs administered in medical facilities across the 
country.  Yet other than excoriating Commissioner Hamburg, Congress has done nothing to 
improve the oversight of the industry.  
As this incident illustrates, the agencies do their best to appear as if they are operating 
normally, when any close observer reaches the unavoidable conclusion that they are being 
prevented from achieving their statutory mission of protecting the public in an effective and 
timely manner.  When industrial activities go wrong, the responsible agency’s harshest critics 
vilify the regulators first, overlooking or making excuses for the corporate executives whose 
negligence caused the disaster.  The result is an excruciating Catch-22:  regulators are de-funded 
and de-fanged, but held to impossible standards when corporate negligence inevitably emerges.  
The real question for Congress is how to revive the agencies assigned to protect the American 
people, not how to demoralize their staffs, cut their budget, and squelch their rules. 
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Executive Summary
It’s likely that few outside of Washington have heard of the Small Business Administration’s 
(SBA) Office of Advocacy,  but this tiny and largely unaccountable office has quietly become 
a highly influential player in the federal regulatory system, wielding extraordinary authority 
over the workplace safety standards employers must follow, the quantity of air pollution 
factories can emit, and the steps that food manufacturers must take to prevent contamination 
of the products that end up on the nation’s dinner tables.
The Office exercises this authority by superintending agency compliance with an expanding 
universe of analytical and procedural requirements—imposed by a steady stream of statutes 
and executive orders issued during the past three decades—that purportedly seek to ensure 
that agencies account for small business interests in their regulatory decision-making.  
Controversial rules can quickly become mired in this procedural muck, and an agency’s 
failure to carry out every last required analysis with sufficient detail and documentation 
can spell doom for even the most important safeguards.  This system provides the Office of 
Advocacy with a powerful lever for slowing down rules or dictating their substance.
The Office of Advocacy’s role in the regulatory system bears a striking resemblance to that 
played by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).  Both 
operate to similar effect, functioning as an anti-regulatory force from within the regulatory 
structure, blocking, delaying, and diluting agency efforts to protect public health and safety.  
Moreover, both offices have entry into the regulatory process on the strength of seemingly 
neutral principles and policy goals—promotion of economic efficiency and protection of 
small business, respectively.  But in actual practice, both offices serve to politicize the process, 
funneling special interest pressure into agency rulemakings, even though such interests 
have already had ample opportunity to comment on proposed regulations.  Despite these 
similarities, however, OIRA receives the bulk of attention from policymakers, the media, and 
the public.
This report shines light on the Office of Advocacy’s anti-regulatory work, examining how 
its participation in the rulemaking process further degrades an already weakened regulatory 
system.  As a preliminary matter, the nominal objective of the Office of Advocacy—
subsidizing small businesses through preferential regulatory treatment1—is based on a 
needless and destructive tradeoff; the government has several policy options for promoting 
small businesses without sacrificing public health and safety.  The Office of Advocacy 
nevertheless devotes much of its time and resources to blocking, delaying, or diluting 
regulatory safeguards or to supporting general anti-regulatory attacks from industry and its 
allies in Congress.  In short, blocking regulations has become the Office of Advocacy’s de 
facto top priority, and its commitment to this goal has led the Office to engage in matters 
that have little or nothing to do with advancing small business interests or with ensuring that 
federal policy reflects the unique needs of these firms.
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More specifically, the report finds that the Office of Advocacy:
•	 Pursues an inherently flawed mission that needlessly sacrifices public health  
and safety;
•	 Adds several unnecessary roadblocks to the rulemaking process, preventing agencies 
from achieving their respective missions of helping people and the environment  
in an effective and timely manner;
•	 Sponsors anti-regulatory research designed to bolster politicized attacks against  
the U.S. regulatory system;
•	 Testifies at congressional hearings aimed at advancing politicized attacks against 
regulations that are inconvenient to well-connected corporate interests;  
•	 Takes advantage of overly broad small business size standards to weaken regulations 
for large firms;
•	 Enables trade association lobbyists to subvert its small business outreach efforts;
•	 Interferes with agency scientific determinations despite lacking both the legal 
authority and relevant expertise to do so; and
•	 Pushes for rule changes that would benefit large firms instead of narrowly tailoring its 
recommendations so that they help only truly small businesses.
The report concludes by identifying several reforms that would enable the Office of Advocacy 
to work constructively with regulatory agencies during the rulemaking process to advance 
small business interests without undermining those agencies’ mission of protecting public 
health and safety.  These recommendations are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Recommendations for Reforming the Office of Advocacy 
A New Mission: Promote 
“Win-Win” Regulatory 
Solutions that Ensure 
Both Small Business 
Competitiveness and 
Strong Protections 
for People and the 
Environment
•	 Congress	should	amend	the	Office	of	Advocacy’s	authorizing	statutes	to	focus	on	
promoting	small	business	“competitiveness”	instead	of	on	reducing	regulatory	impacts	
or	burdens.
•	 Congress	should	provide	the	SBA	with	additional	legal	authorities	to	establish	new	
subsidy	programs	that	affirmatively	assist	small	businesses	meet	effective	regulatory	
standards	without	undermining	their	competitiveness.
•	 Congress	should	establish	and	fully	fund	a	network	of	small	business	regulatory	
compliance	assistance	offices.
•	 Congress	should	significantly	increase	agency	budgets	so	that	they	can	effectively	
account	for	small	business	concerns	in	rulemakings	without	hindering	their	ability	to	
move	forward	with	needed	safeguards.
•	 The	Office	of	Advocacy	should	identify	and	implement	regulatory	solutions	that	will	
enable	small	businesses	to	meet	strong	public	health	and	safety	standards	while	
remaining	competitive	with	larger	firms.		At	a	minimum,	these	solutions	should	
include	regulatory	compliance	assistance,	finding	opportunities	to	partner	small	
businesses	in	mutually	beneficial	ways,	and	securing	subsidized	loans	to	cover	
compliance	costs.
•	 The	Office	of	Advocacy	should	develop	new	guidance	that	helps	agencies	better	
address	small	business	concerns	in	rulemakings	by	working	toward	win-win	regulatory	
solutions.
•	 The	President	should	revoke	Executive	Order	13272,	which	empowers	the	Office	of	
Advocacy	to	work	with	OIRA	to	interfere	in	agency	rules.
Restored Focus: Helping 
Truly Small Businesses 
Only
•	 Congress	should	revise	the	Office	of	Advocacy’s	small	business	size	standards		
so	that	they	(1)	focus	on	truly	small	businesses	(i.e.,	those	with	20	or	fewer	employees)		
and	(2)	prevent	the	Office	from	working	on	behalf	of	all	firms,	regardless	of	size,		
that	work	in	industrial	sectors	that	pose	a	high	risk	to	public	health	and	safety.
•	 Congress	should	prohibit	the	Office	of	Advocacy	from	working	with	non-small	
businesses	and	should	establish	legal	mechanisms	for	ensuring	that	this	prohibition	is	
observed.
•	 Congress	should	conduct	more	frequent	and	thorough	oversight	of	the	Office	of	
Advocacy.
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In recent years, corporate interests and their anti-regulatory allies in Congress have 
championed several bills that would enhance the Office of Advocacy’s power to prevent 
agencies from carrying out their statutory missions of protecting public health and safety.  
Two bills—the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act and the Freedom from Restrictive 
Excessive Executive Demands and Onerous Mandates Act—would require agencies to 
complete several new analytical and procedural requirements purportedly aimed at reducing 
regulatory burdens on small businesses.  The bills would empower the Office of Advocacy 
to monitor agency compliance with these requirements, bolstering its ability to interfere in 
individual rulemakings.  A third bill, the Clearing Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens Act, 
would authorize the Office of Advocacy to second-guess agency civil enforcement actions 
against small businesses for certain first-time violations of regulatory reporting requirements.
These bills are part of the broader wave of anti-regulatory attacks that has dominated the 
political landscape ever since the Republican Party’s success in the 2010 congressional 
elections.  When launching these attacks, anti-regulatory advocates frequently invoke small-
business concerns.  Small business has become a highly romanticized, almost mythological 
concept among the public and policymakers alike, evoking images of small “mom and pop” 
stores lining the idyllic Main Street of some quaint village.  Because no politician wants to 
run the risk of being painted as “anti-small business,” anti-regulatory advocates have worked 
tirelessly to promote their cause as essential to helping small businesses.  Moreover, recent 
high profile catastrophes involving inadequately regulated large businesses—including the 
BP oil spill and the Wall Street financial collapse—have provided anti-regulatory advocates 
with additional impetus to adopt the frame of small business to advance their agenda.  In 
this atmosphere, proposals to expand the powers of the reliably anti-regulatory Office of 
Advocacy have become especially attractive to policymakers intent on weakening the nation’s 
already fragile regulatory system.
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Background: The Pervasive Problem  
of Under-Regulation
The United States faces a problem of under-regulation.  The regulatory system is supposed  
to protect public health and safety against unacceptable risks, but the destructive  
convergence of inadequate resources, political interference, and outmoded legal authority 
often prevents regulatory agencies from fulfilling this task in a timely and effective manner.  
Unsupervised industry “self-regulation” has filled the resulting vacuum, yielding predictably 
catastrophic results.
Evidence of inadequate regulation and enforcement abounds—from the BP oil spill  
in the Gulf of Mexico to the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster that claimed the lives  
of 29 men; from the decaying natural gas pipeline networks running beneath our homes  
to the growing risk of imported food tainted with salmonella, botulism, or other 
contaminants showing up on grocery store shelves.  And, of course, inadequate regulation 
of the financial services industry triggered the current economic recession and left millions 
unemployed, financially ruined, or both.
The proliferation of analytical and procedural requirements in the rulemaking process  
is a significant cause of this dysfunction.2  Regulatory agencies must negotiate these analytical 
hurdles, even as their statutory responsibilities expand and their budgets remain constant 
or shrink.  As agencies grow more “hollowed-out”—stretched thin by the demands of 
doing more with less—their pursuit of new safeguards becomes subject to increasing delays, 
while many critical tasks are never addressed at all.3  Careful analysis is important, but the 
regulatory process has already become so ossified by needless procedures and analyses that 
rulemakings commonly require between four and eight years to complete.4  Many of these 
analyses and procedures also provide powerful avenues for political interference in individual 
rulemakings, as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA) centralized 
regulatory review process clearly illustrates.5  A recent CPR study found that OIRA 
frequently uses this review process to delay or weaken rules following closed-door meetings 
with corporate lobbyists.6 
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The Office of Advocacy Pushes the Regulatory 
Process Toward Less Effective Regulation
Since its creation, the Office of Advocacy’s role in the rulemaking process has continually 
expanded, providing it with numerous opportunities to intervene in and potentially 
undermine individual rulemakings.  Congress created the Office to represent small business 
in the regulatory system and to advocate for reduced regulation of small business.  From 
this limited mandate to advocate on behalf of small businesses, the Office has morphed into 
an institutionalized opponent of regulation, slowing the regulatory process and diluting 
the protection of people and the environment against unreasonable risks.  Yet, there is 
insufficient public recognition of how the Office participates in the rulemaking process  
and why its participation ends up making it more difficult for agencies to reduce safety, 
health and environmental risks.  In addition, the Office engages in activities that bolster 
political attacks on regulation, such as publishing estimates of regulatory costs that are  
wildly inaccurate, and that fly in the face of estimates from other agencies of government 
with considerably greater expertise in the area.  Such activities are frequently undertaken  
in conjunction with interest groups and trade associations that represent large business,  
not small ones.  At times it is difficult to find any difference between the positions taken  
by the Office and those taken by such prominent regulatory opponents as the U.S.  
Chamber of Commerce.
Significantly, when the Office interferes in agency efforts to do the people’s business—that 
is, implement and enforce duly enacted legislation—it does so free of virtually any public 
accountability mechanisms.  The Office is housed within, but institutionally insulated from 
the Small Businesses Administration (SBA), a federal agency that supports America’s small 
business sector through subsidized loans, preferential government contracting, and other 
assistance programs.  As such, no chain of command connects the Office to either the head 
of the SBA or the President.7  At the same time, Congress has shirked its responsibility to 
provide meaningful oversight of the Office’s activities.  While Office of Advocacy officials 
have testified at dozens of hearings in the last 16 years, only four of those hearings could be 
described as oversight hearings for the Office.8  (In reality, two of those four hearings focused 
on supposed weaknesses in the Office’s legal authorities and proposals for strengthening those 
authorities, rather than critically evaluating its performance.)  By comparison, Congress has 
held dozens of oversight hearings for the EPA in the last year alone.  Because of the lack 
of active oversight, Congress has no way to keep track of the Office’s participation in the 
regulatory process or to ensure that it is not abusing its authority to intervene in rules to 
benefit politically powerful corporate interests at the expensive of public health and safety.
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A Flawed Mission: Needlessly Sacrificing Public Health  
and Safety
Preferential regulatory treatment for small business can include regulatory exemptions; 
less stringent or delayed regulatory requirements; and relaxed enforcement for regulatory 
violations, such as waived or reduced penalties.  As with other subsidies that small businesses 
receive—such as subsidized loans, tax breaks, and preferential government procurement  
and contracting policies9—preferential regulatory treatment makes it easier for people 
to start and sustain small businesses.  But it also enables these businesses to avoid taking 
responsibility for pollution, workplace risks, or any other socially harmful byproducts of their 
activities.  In other words, preferential regulatory treatment involves an explicit policy choice 
to shift the costs of these social harms from small businesses to the general public.
Governments typically subsidize an activity because they want more of the benefits that the 
activity produces.  Accordingly, policymakers typically justify small business subsidies on the 
grounds that these businesses generate greater job growth and innovation as compared to 
non-small businesses.  As numerous studies have demonstrated, however, small businesses 
actually create very few jobs on net, and the evidence is at best mixed as to whether these 
firms create more innovation (however that concept is defined and measured).10
Whatever jobs or other economic benefits small businesses do create come at a certain 
societal price.  As Professor Richard Pierce of The George Washington University Law 
School has pointed out, preferential regulatory treatment for small businesses can be 
“socially destructive,” because such firms produce greater amounts of many social harms 
as compared to their larger counterparts—including dangerous workplaces, instances of 
racial discrimination, and air and water pollution.11  For example, one study found that the 
risk of a fatal work-related accident is 500 times greater for employees of small businesses 
than for employees of large businesses.  In addition, small businesses are less likely than 
their larger counterparts to reduce their social harms in the absence of enforcement-backed 
regulation.12  Since the cost of reducing social harms is often disproportionately greater for 
small businesses, they have a stronger economic incentive to avoid pursuing reductions as 
much as possible.  Further, both reputational concerns and fear of lawsuits are less likely to 
motivate small businesses to reduce their social harms.  Because many small businesses work 
in relatively anonymity, they tend not to suffer significant reputational costs when they are 
caught polluting or operating a dangerous workplace.  Typically lacking “deep pockets,” 
small businesses also tend not to be attractive defendants, even when their socially harmful 
activities have clearly injured others.
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Preferential regulatory treatment doesn’t just let small businesses off the hook for the social 
harms they create; it can also enable larger businesses to avoid taking responsibility for their 
social harms as well.13  When small firms are exempted from regulation, larger businesses 
have a strong incentive to try to game the system by outsourcing their more socially harmful 
activities to them.
These concerns expose the fundamental flaw in the Office’s core mission:  Its work to weaken 
regulatory requirements for small businesses comes at too high a cost in terms of increased 
risks to public health, safety, and the environment.  Preferential regulatory treatment is the 
worst kind of subsidy to provide for small businesses, since, as compared to larger firms, they 
often produce disproportionately greater amounts of the kind of social harms that regulations 
are meant to alleviate.  To the extent that the Office succeeds at securing preferential 
regulatory treatment for small businesses, it is affirmatively promoting the uniquely 
disproportionate amount of social harms they create.
The Office of Advocacy Creates Roadblocks to Effective 
Regulation
Passed by Congress in 1976, Pub. L. 94-30514 created the Office of Advocacy and charged 
it with representing small businesses before federal agencies.  With the passage of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act15 (Reg-Flex) in 1980, Congress made preferential regulatory 
treatment of small businesses an explicit goal of the rulemaking process and empowered the 
Office to push agencies to pursue this goal.  The enactment of the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) in 1996 and the issuance of Executive Order 13272 
by George W. Bush in 2002 has further strengthened the Office’s role as an opponent of 
effective regulation.
Using its authority under Pub. L. 94-305, Reg-Flex, and Executive Order 13272, the 
Office has employed compliance guidance, regulatory comments, and congressional 
communications to push agencies to delay, weaken, or abandon crucial rulemakings.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Analytical Requirements
Reg-Flex requires agencies to perform several resource-intensive and time-consuming analyses 
of their rules to assess their potential impacts on small businesses.  These analyses, layered 
as they are on top of the existing morass of regulatory-impact analyses, create an additional 
battery of procedural obstacles, further contributing to the ossification problem that already 
prevents agencies from developing effective new safeguards in a timely fashion.
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Reg-Flex’s analytical requirements apply only if, prior to proposing the rule, the agency finds 
that it would have a “significant economic impact” on a large number of small businesses, 
a concept that the Act fails to define.  Otherwise, the agency can “certify” that the rule 
will not have such an impact, exempting it from the statute’s remaining requirements.  For 
rules found to have a significant impact, the agency must prepare two different “regulatory 
flexibility” analyses, an “initial” analysis for the proposed version of the rule and a “final” one 
for the final version.
The two regulatory flexibility analyses provide an inherently distorted picture of the 
regulations being assessed—one that is heavily biased against protective safeguards.  Agencies 
must focus exclusively on the rule’s potential costs on small businesses; the rule’s benefits—
the reason the agency is developing the rule at all—are ignored.  In addition, the agency 
must evaluate possible alternatives that would “minimize” the rule’s costs for small businesses. 
Among the alternatives that agencies must consider are rules that exempt small businesses, 
impose weaker standards, or phase in regulatory requirements over a longer timeline.  Again, 
benefits are ignored:  Such analysis automatically disregards any alternatives that would 
provide greater protections at equal or only slighter greater cost to small busineses.
Within 10 years of their completion, significant impact rules must go through still a third 
analysis—the Reg-Flex periodic look-back requirement.  Reg-Flex requires that agencies 
review these rules to determine whether they should be eliminated or amended to “minimize” 
costs on small business.  Again, this one-sided, anti-regulatory analytical framework ignores 
regulatory benefits and does not allow agencies to consider expanding rules that have proved 
to be successful.
Reg-Flex’s Look-Back Requirement:  The Real Record
A	recent	CPR	study	reviewed	the	Reg-Flex	look-backs	for	nearly	40	
Environmental	Protection	Agency	and	Occupational	Safety	and	Health	
Administration	regulations	and	found	that	nearly	every	one	had	concluded	
that	the	regulations	were	still	necessary	and	did	not	adversely	impact	small	
businesses.
Source:	Sidney	Shapiro	et	al.,	Saving Lives, Preserving the Environment, Growing the Economy: The 
Truth About Regulation	10	(Ctr.	for	Progressive	Reform,	White	Paper	1109,	2011),	available at	
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/RegBenefits_1109.pdf.
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In 1996, Congress amended Reg-Flex to make agency compliance with several  
of its provisions—including certification that a rule will not have a significant impact  
on small businesses—judicially reviewable.  This amendment makes all agency analyses  
part of the record for judicial review, and it authorizes reviewing courts to reject a rule  
on the sole basis that the agency had failed to adequately comply with one of the Act’s 
procedural requirements.
Guidance on Complying with the Regulatory Flexibility Act
Responding to Executive Order 13272’s requirement that the Office of Advocacy “train” 
agencies on how to comply with Reg-Flex, the Office has issued a guidance document 
in which it spells out in great detail its excessively strict interpretation of Reg-Flex’s 
requirements.  (The Office most recently updated and expanded the document in May 
of 2012.)  For example, in the guidance, the Office seeks to strongly discourage agencies 
from certifying their rules (i.e., formally concluding that the rules will not have a 
significant impact on small businesses, thereby exempting them from Reg-Flex’s procedural 
requirements) by demanding that they build a virtually bulletproof record to support  
the certification, including providing specific data on how many businesses the rule would 
affect and what economic effect the rule would have on those businesses.16  In so doing, 
the Office sought to expand the range of rules subject to its influence (i.e., by increasing 
the number of rules subject to Reg-Flex procedural requirements that the Office oversees).  
Moreover, generating such data about a rule’s potential impacts so early in a rulemaking  
is nearly impossible even under the best circumstances.  Nevertheless, whenever agencies  
are unable to satisfy the Office’s strict certification record requirement, the guide advises 
agencies to conduct an initial regulatory flexibility analysis or even conduct a full-blown 
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, procedures that add months to the process  
and waste scarce agency resources. 
Remarkably, in the guidance, the Office also directs agencies to consider in their initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis regulatory alternatives that are not even within an agency’s 
legal authority to adopt.  So, for example, the Office would encourage an agency to develop 
a rule that requires small businesses to test a piece of safety equipment only once a year, 
even though the underlying statute mandates that such equipment be tested at least twice a 
year.  The guidance imposes this requirement even though Reg-Flex does not authorize it.  
Instead, the Act stipulates that any alternatives that agencies consider to minimize costs for 
small businesses must still meet applicable “statutory objectives.”17  In clear contradiction of  
Reg-Flex’s plain language, the Office asserts in the guidance “that the IRFA [initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis] is designed to explore less burdensome alternatives and not simply those 
alternatives it is legally permitted to implement.”18  
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Regulatory Comments
Pursuant to its authority under Pub. L. 94-305 to represent small businesses before federal 
agencies, the Office of Advocacy frequently comments on agencies’ proposed rules in order to 
criticize agencies for not following its excessively strict interpretation of Reg-Flex’s procedural 
requirements.19  In its recent comments, the Office typically invokes the strict interpretation 
of these provisions that it has outlined in its Reg-Flex compliance guidance document.
Invariably, the faults that the Office of Advocacy asserts are aimed either at increasing  
the procedural burdens of Reg-Flex’s requirements—and thus adding more delay  
to a rulemaking—or at weakening agency rules outright.  The Office might claim that  
an agency has improperly certified that its rule will not have a large impact on small business  
(and thus is not subject to Reg-Flex’s requirements).  Or it might claim that the agency  
has not properly carried out required Reg-Flex analyses, perhaps alleging that an agency 
hasn’t included enough detail or factual evidence, or that the agency has underestimated 
a rule’s costs or has failed to considered adequate weaker alternatives.  For example, in its 
recent comments on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services’ (FWS) proposed rule that revises 
the agency’s critical habitat designation for the Northern Spotted Owl, the Office argued that 
the FWS’s evidentiary record in support of certification lacked the necessary specific data and 
detail called for in its compliance guidance document.20  With such comments, the Office 
seeks to use procedural hurdles of its own creation as a way to hamstring federal regulators 
working to fulfill their statutory obligations to regulate within their areas of expertise.
Through Executive Order 13272, the President has given the Office’s comments special 
weight, making it difficult for an agency to dismiss the comments, even when they lack 
merit.  The Order directs agencies to “[g]ive every appropriate consideration” to these 
comments.  The Order further requires that agencies specifically respond to any of the 
Office’s written comments in the preamble to the final rule.
Many reviewing courts take the Office’s comments as powerful evidence that an agency has 
failed to comply with Reg-Flex, though these courts are otherwise not obliged to defer  
to the Office’s interpretations of Reg-Flex’s provisions.21  For example, a federal district court 
rejected a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) rule setting commercial fishing quotas 
for Atlantic shark species after finding that the agency had failed to comply with various 
Reg-Flex procedures.22  (As noted above, agency compliance with Reg-Flex’s provisions is 
judicially reviewable, and courts have the authority to reject rules if they determine that an 
agency has failed to adequately comply with one or more of these provisions.)  The court’s 
analysis in support of this finding relied heavily on the comments that the Office submitted 
during the rulemaking process.23
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Reports to Congress and Congressional Testimony
Reg-Flex and Executive Order 13272 direct the Office of Advocacy to monitor and report  
to Congress annually on agency compliance with Reg-Flex’s requirements.  In these reports, 
the Office provides detailed critiques of each agency’s purported failures to implement Reg-
Flex in accordance with the Office’s strict interpretation of the Act’s provisions.  For example, 
in its most recent report, the Office of Advocacy faulted the initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) performed for its proposed rules 
requiring dietary information labeling for chain restaurant menus and vending machines, 
arguing that the agency’s analysis underestimated both the number of small businesses the 
rules would impact and the regulatory costs the rules would impose on those businesses.24  
The FDA developed these rules to implement two provisions in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—the 2010 health care system reform law.  One objective of 
the PPACA was to reduce overall health care costs in the United States, and these provisions 
were aimed at helping Americans to adopt healthier diets, which in turn would enable them 
to avoid potentially expensive medical problems in the future.
For agencies eager to avoid attracting unwanted attention from congressional members 
ideologically opposed to their statutory mission, the threat of negative reports from the 
Office can have a strong coercive on their activities.  Many agencies take self-defeating 
preemptive actions, such as preparing overly elaborate or unrequired analyses or drafting 
inappropriately weak rules—actions that waste scarce agency resources and dilute 
public health and safety protections.  The Office’s negative report regarding the FDA’s 
implementation of these two controversial provisions in the PPACA undoubtedly has 
supplied welcome ammunition to congressional Republicans who continue to wage a full-
scale assault on the law.25  The fear of attracting this kind of bad publicity likely pushes the 
FDA and others agencies engaged in implementing the health care reform law to be overly 
cautious with their Reg-Flex compliance, even when detrimental to the public interest.
In addition to the annual reports, Office of Advocacy officials also testify at congressional 
hearings to complain about what they claim are failures by agencies to properly fulfill  
Reg-Flex requirements.  For example, in April of 2011, the Deputy Chief Counsel for 
the Office of Advocacy testified at a House Oversight Committee hearing dedicated to 
attacking the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) greenhouse gas regulations.  In her 
testimony, the Deputy Chief Counsel argued that the EPA had failed to comply with several 
requirements, including criticizing the factual basis the agency supplied to justify certifying 
its first vehicle efficiency standard as not having a significant impact on small businesses.26   
As with the annual reports, the threat of negative publicity from Office of Advocacy 
testimony can push agencies to overcompensate in their Reg-Flex compliance efforts.  
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Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act Panels
The 1996 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) amended  
Reg-Flex to require the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) to give specially assembled small business panels a chance to oppose proposed 
rules before the rest of the public even has a chance to see them.  Following the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform bill, congressional Republicans quickly enacted a bill 
that subjected the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency created by the 
Dodd-Frank statute to help implement many of its reform provisions, to the SBREFA panel 
requirement as well.
The three agencies must undertake the SBREFA panel process for all planned rules that are 
predicted to have a significant impact on small businesses—the same trigger for the various 
other Reg-Flex analytical requirements.  However, as with the Reg-Flex requirements, an 
agency need not undertake the SBREFA panel process if it formally certifies that its planned 
rule will not have a significant impact on small businesses.  As noted above, an agency’s 
decision to certify is subject to judicial review.  Given that the Office has set such a high bar 
for justifying certification, the threat of judicial review can strongly discourage agencies from 
certifying a rule, even when this step would be appropriate.
In some cases, the Office has pressured agencies into undertaking the functional equivalent  
of a SBREFA panel, even though their planned rule plainly would not have a significant 
impact on small businesses.  For instance, OSHA buckled under Office of Advocacy pressure 
and conducted a pseudo-SBREFA panel process for its then-planned “300 log MSD column” 
rule, which would have added a column to the required injury and illness recording form 
so that employers can keep track of their workers’ employment-related musculoskeletal 
injuries.27  OSHA went through this process even though the rule’s projected costs would 
amount to a mere $4.00 per employer in its first year and $0.67 every year thereafter.28
Much like the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA) centralized review 
process, the SBREFA panel process focuses on weakening rules because the panels are 
dominated by interests opposed to strong regulatory requirements.  Beside the rulemaking 
agency representatives, each SBREFA panel must include the Chief Counsel of the Office 
of Advocacy (i.e., the individual who heads the Office), OIRA officials, and small business 
“representatives.”  The Office works with these other outside participants to criticize an 
agency’s rule with the goal of weakening it.  At the end of the process, the panel prepares a 
report compiling all of the criticisms of the draft rule, which is then included in the official 
rulemaking record.
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Reg-Flex requires that a rulemaking agency respond to the criticisms included in the 
panel’s report, and a failure to do so can provide a reviewing court with a basis to reject 
the underlying rule.  This process contributes to the ossification of the rulemaking process, 
mentioned earlier, and it can create a potent incentive for an agency to weaken the rule rather 
than mount a time-consuming defense of a stronger rule, which would require producing an 
elaborate analysis to respond to all the criticisms raised in the SBREFA panel report.
SBREFA panel-related delays can add up to a year to the rulemaking process if not 
longer.  These delays come on top of the several months of delay that the other Reg-Flex 
requirements introduce into the rulemaking process.  By law, the formal panel period is 
supposed to last around two months.  But, eager to avoid extensive criticism during the 
SBREFA panel process, agencies frequently spend months revising their planned rules 
and any underlying economic analyses prior to convening the formal panel.  For example, 
preparations for the SBREFA panel process appear to have delayed OSHA’s work on the 
Injury and Illness Prevention Program (I2P2) rule by more than a year.  In June of 2011, 
the agency had planned to convene a SBREFA panel for its rule by the end of the month.  
Eventually, OSHA pushed this date back to January of 2012 and then March of 2012.29  
According to Office of Advocacy records, OSHA still has not convened this panel,30  
bringing the total delay to 16 months and counting.
Centralized Regulatory Review at the Office of Information  
and Regulatory Affairs
Executive Order 13272 directs the Office of Advocacy to work closely with OIRA—another 
institution that serves to weaken regulation, as previous CPR reports have discussed—
when intervening in agency rules.  The Office frequently takes advantage of the Order’s 
authorization to meet with OIRA to raise concerns about proposed agency rules.  In fact, 
a 2012 report from CPR on OIRA meetings with outside advocates found that the Office 
participated in 122 of the 1,080 reported meetings (or more than 11 percent) that OIRA 
held over the 10-year period covered in the CPR study.31  The Office was by far the most 
frequent non-White House participant in OIRA meetings and attended more than three 
times the number of meetings attended by the most active industry participant, the American 
Chemistry Council (39 meetings).32
This Executive Order builds off of a March 2002 Memorandum of Understanding, which 
establishes a formal partnership between the Office and OIRA to strictly enforce Reg-Flex’s 
procedural requirements to “achieve a reduction” in regulatory burdens for small businesses.33 
The Memorandum directs the Office to seek OIRA’s assistance in pushing agencies to 
take corrective action—including more detailed analyses, evaluating additional less costly 
alternatives, or even adopting a less costly alternative—when the Office determines that they 
have failed to satisfy its strict interpretation of Reg-Flex’s requirements.  Given that OIRA 
has the power to reject the rules it reviews, agencies are unlikely to ignore its demands for 
Reg-Flex-related corrective actions.  As such, OIRA provides powerful reinforcement in the 
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unlikely event that the Office is unable to extract these corrective actions on its own.   
The Memorandum also deputizes OIRA to aid in monitoring agency compliance with 
Reg-Flex requirements as part of its normal regulatory review activities.  Whenever 
OIRA determines that an agency has likely failed to satisfy the Office of Advocacy’s strict 
interpretation of any Reg-Flex requirements, it must then work with the Office to push  
the offending agency to take corrective action. 
Participation in Lawsuits Challenging Rules
Reg-Flex authorizes the Office of Advocacy to join in lawsuits brought by industry to 
challenge agency rules, enabling it to push the reviewing court to reject rules for failing 
to satisfy applicable Reg-Flex procedural requirements.34  These lawsuits create the highly 
unusual scenario in which one office within the Executive Branch is actively engaged  
in a legally binding effort to undermine an action taken by another office within the  
Executive Branch.
The Office of Advocacy has already participated in several lawsuits in which the reviewing 
court returned the rule to the agency to bring the underlying analyses into compliance with 
one or more of Reg-Flex’s provisions.35  In response to these adverse rulings, agencies must 
undertake new and more detailed analyses, delaying the implementation of their rules and 
using up scarce agency resources.
The Office of Advocacy Bolsters Political Attacks on Regulations
In addition to the previous rulemaking-related activities, the Office of Advocacy has taken 
actions to buttress the attacks that industry and its allies in Congress have waged against  
the U.S. regulatory system as a whole.
Sponsoring Anti-Regulatory Research
Over the years, the Office of Advocacy has doled out taxpayer money to sponsor several 
research projects brazenly designed to advance the cause of further weakening the U.S. 
regulatory system.  Non-governmental researchers carry out these projects under contracts 
awarded by the Office with little in the way of oversight or peer review.
The most egregious Office of Advocacy-sponsored research project was the 2010 study 
by economists Nicole Crain and Mark Crain, which purported to find that the annual 
cost of federal regulations in 2008 was about $1.75 trillion.36  As a CPR white paper first 
found,37 and a separate evaluation by the non-partisan Congressional Research Service 
later confirmed,38 Crain and Crain were only able to achieve this outlandish cost figure by 
employing faulty models, biased assumptions, and erroneous data.  The report’s myriad 
methodological defects all have a distinctly anti-regulatory bias, each leading inevitably  
to overstated cost calculations.  Beyond these methodological defects, the Crain and Crain 
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report is noteworthy for what it omits:  any attempt to account for regulatory benefits.   
The report’s exclusive focus on regulatory costs—absurdly high cost estimates, in fact—while 
ignoring benefits provides an inherently distorted picture of the regulatory system that is 
skewed against all safeguards, no matter how critical they are for protecting public  
health and safety
The Office’s flawed management of the Crain and Crain report contract was equally 
disturbing.  The contract failed to require the report’s authors to disclose all of the 
report’s underlying data, models, assumptions, and calculations, making it impossible 
to independently verify the integrity of the report’s findings.  In addition, the Office of 
Advocacy’s peer review process for the report was woefully inadequate:  One reviewer raised 
significant concerns with the report’s underlying methodology which were never addressed 
while the other’s review consisted of only the following 11-word comment:  “I looked it over 
and it’s terrific, nothing to add. Congrats[.]”39
Despite the Crain and Crain report’s dubious provenance, regulatory opponents routinely 
cite its findings when attacking the U.S. regulatory system or pushing for legislation that 
would undermine agencies’ ability to carry out their mission of protecting public health and 
safety.  The report’s biased frame and risibly overstated findings are tailor-made to support 
the false conservative narrative that eliminating regulatory safeguards will translate into 
economic growth and job creation.  For example, the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, which has held dozens of anti-regulatory hearings since the committee 
returned to Republican control, cited the Crain and Crain report and its findings extensively 
in a February 2011 study, which attempts to make the specious argument that pending 
regulations are stifling job creation.40  Similarly, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) invoked the Crain 
and Crain report when arguing for the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny 
Act, a bill he sponsored that would effectively shut the regulatory system down by blocking 
all major regulations unless a majority in both Houses of Congress voted within 90 days to 
approve them.41
Participating in Anti-Regulatory Congressional Hearings
Office of Advocacy officials have long served as loyal allies in Congress’s anti-regulatory 
hearings, consistently delivering testimony that reinforces the political case for weakening 
regulations and further hobbling the regulatory system.  As noted, these officials frequently 
testify to criticize agency compliance with Reg-Flex procedural requirements, but the same 
testimony is also broadly critical of the regulatory system as a whole, echoing the talking 
points typically found in the testimony of industry representatives or in the opening 
statements of anti-regulatory Members of Congress.  For example, the head of the Office of 
Advocacy during the George W. Bush Administration testified at a 2005 House Committee 
on Government Reform hearing focused on attacking various EPA regulations.  His 
testimony helped advance the transparently political agenda of the hearing by strongly 
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criticizing EPA regulations as unduly burdensome—while conspicuously ignoring their 
benefits—and by advocating for rolling them back.42
Office of Advocacy officials have also testified at hearings to support passage of several 
pending anti-regulatory bills.  In his testimony at a 2006 hearing, for example, the then head 
of the Office of Advocacy asserted that the Office “supports the goals of” a proposed bill 
that would amend Reg-Flex’s procedural and analytical requirements to make them more 
burdensome for agencies to complete.43  
The Office of Advocacy Engages in Anti-Regulatory Activities 
Unrelated to Helping Small Businesses
The focal point of the Office of Advocacy’s institutional mission has evolved from seeking 
preferential regulatory treatment for small businesses to opposing all regulations.  Aided 
and abetted by industry groups and their political allies, the Office pursues this mission by 
working to block regulations opposed by large corporate interests and attempting to interfere 
in the scientific underpinning of agency regulations.
The Office of Advocacy’s Small Business Size Standards Are Overly Broad
For the purposes of implementing Reg-Flex, the Office of Advocacy employs a definition  
of “small business” that is a far cry from the common understanding of that term’s meaning.   
Instead of being based on a single number (for example, any firm with 20 or fewer 
employees), the definition is actually a complex scheme that sets varying size standards 
for each industrial sector within the economy.44  Critically, these standards are based on 
the relative size of different firms within each given industry, and, as a result, the “small 
businesses” in industries that comprise mostly large-sized firms can be huge.  In some sectors, 
the definition of small business includes firms that employ more than 1,000 workers.   
For example, the Office considers a petroleum refinery to be a “small business” as long as it 
employs fewer than 1,500 workers.  Similarly, chemical plants that employ fewer than 1,000 
workers are a “small business” in the Office’s eyes.
Because of these overly broad small business size standards, the Office is able to push 
for preferential regulatory treatment for relatively large firms, firms far bigger than the 
term “small business” suggests.  For example, in August of 2011, the Office submitted 
comments on the EPA’s proposed rule to reduce hazardous air pollution for fossil fuel-based 
power plants criticizing the agency’s efforts to comply with several Reg-Flex procedural 
requirements, including the SBREFA panel process.  Among other things, the Office 
argued that the EPA had not adequately considered potentially less burdensome regulatory 
alternatives for “small business” power plants in its initial regulatory flexibility analysis.45
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Trade Association Lobbyists Subvert the Office of Advocacy’s Small Business 
Outreach Efforts
In addition, large corporate interests have supplied representatives for SBREFA panels.  For 
example, a lobbyist from the American Farm Bureau—a politically powerful trade group that 
typically works to advance the interests of industrial-scale farms—recently served as a “small 
business” representative on the SBREFA panel for the EPA’s 2010 update to its renewable 
fuel standard program.46  By permitting organizations such as the American Farm Bureau 
to participate in SBREFA panels, the Office of Advocacy has stretched the concept of small 
business representative beyond all recognition.  The American Farm Bureau’s membership 
includes several industrial-scale agriculture operations that would not meet even the Office’s 
generous definition of small business.  And, the interests of these industrial-scale operations 
often dictate the organization’s political agenda, even when those interests are antithetical 
to those of genuinely small farms.47  For example, the catastrophic droughts that affected 
much of the United States this past summer provided a glimpse of the harsh impacts that 
climate change will have on America’s small farmers.  Nevertheless, the American Farm 
Bureau worked tirelessly to help defeat the 2009 climate change bill that would have curbed 
greenhouse gas emissions through a comprehensive cap-and-trade system.48
In some cases, the small business representatives who participate in SBREFA panels come 
at the suggestion of lobbyists for large trade associations, such as the National Association 
of Home Builders, whose members include large corporations that do not meet the Office’s 
small business size standards.49  This practice raises the concern that lobbyists operating to 
advance the interests of large corporations improperly use small businesses representatives as 
surrogates to attack rules they oppose, enabling these corporate interests to avoid incurring 
any potential political costs for opposing safeguards that are otherwise popular with the 
general public.
The participation of large corporate interests defeats the objective of SBREFA panels—
namely, to gather the perspective of small business on pending regulations that would 
otherwise not be available in the absence of these panels.  These panels offer small businesses 
a critical opportunity to offer their unique concerns regarding a planned rule—an 
opportunity that is all the more important because large corporate interests have come to 
dominate every other step in the rulemaking process, including notice-and-comment and 
OIRA’s centralized review.50  By permitting lobbyists for trade associations and other large 
corporate groups take part in SBREFA panels, the Office risks allowing the voice of truly 
small businesses to be drowned out at this stage of the rulemaking process as well.
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The Office of Advocacy Interferes with Agency Scientific Determinations
The Office of Advocacy frequently operates outside its legal authority and scientific expertise 
by weighing in on agencies’ purely scientific determinations.  For example, in October 
of 2011, the Office submitted regulatory comments criticizing the EPA’s Integrated Risk 
Information System (IRIS) program.51  A frequent target of industry attacks, IRIS  
is a centralized database that gathers human health risk assessments for various  
environmental contaminants, which the EPA can use to set regulatory standards.52  
Specifically, the Office criticized the data and models that the EPA had used in its IRIS risk 
assessment for the harmful chemical hexavalent chromium, and it urged the agency to revise 
its assessment, a process that would waste scarce resources and delay the final assessment by 
several months.  The Office also recommended that the EPA reform the entire IRIS program, 
arguing that it lacked “objectivity” and adequate “scientific rigor.”53  Such recommendations 
are far beyond the expertise of the Office and have unique interests of small business.   
They do, however, bear a striking resemblance to the arguments that industry lobbyists  
make about IRIS assessments.
The Office intervenes in these kinds of scientific determinations despite the fact that they  
do not independently impose any regulatory requirements, and thus have no real impact  
on small businesses.  In June of 2009, the Office intervened in the EPA’s proposed 
greenhouse gas endangerment finding, which did nothing more than certify the federal 
government’s official finding that greenhouse gases “endanger public health and welfare”  
by contributing to global climate change.  Nevertheless, the Office argued in its comments 
that the EPA should abandon the effort completely.54  The comments added nothing 
constructive to the EPA’s endangerment finding efforts, failing to address any of the scientific 
questions at issue.  Instead, the Office devoted its comments to arguing that the Clean Air 
Act’s regulatory programs were not well suited to regulating greenhouse gases and might 
disproportionately harm small businesses—all hypothetical and unrelated matters that would 
be better addressed in comments on any actual Clean Air Act rules aimed at regulating 
greenhouse gases. Again, such arguments were not grounded in any expertise the Office 
might have, or in any unique small business interest, but they did comport with big-business 
criticisms of the EPA’s finding.
The Office’s decision to move into regulatory science is far removed from its statutory 
mission to argue for preferential regulatory treatment for small business.  This interest 
in attacking regulatory science can only be understood as the Office assuming the role 
of arguing against more stringent regulation in all forums that may relate to regulatory 
protections, even ones where the agency has no expertise.
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The Office of Advocacy Pushes for Weaker Regulatory Requirements for 
Large Businesses
The Office of Advocacy commonly seeks to weaken the requirements of proposed rules  
for all affected entities, rather than seeking rule changes that are tailored to reducing adverse 
impacts on small firms only.  For example, in its comments on the EPA’s proposed rule  
to limit hazardous air pollutants from oil- and coal-fueled power plants, the Office criticized 
the agency for not considering as a regulatory alternative a rule that would merely limit 
plants’ mercury emissions.  Remarkably, the Office recommended that this drastically scaled-
back rule apply to all power plants, regardless of their size.55  Such an alternative would 
provide no unique preferential regulatory treatment for “small” power plants.  It would also 
leave unregulated all of the other toxic air pollutants that power plants release—including 
arsenic, lead, and formaldehyde—in clear violation of the Clean Air Act.56  While this 
alternative would certainly reduce regulatory costs for small power plants, its primary effect 
would be to provide a huge regulatory subsidy to the large power plants that dominate the 
electricity generating industry.  Here again, the Office offered commentary that could just 
have easily been written by big-business or special interest lobbyists, rather than focusing on 
an small-business interest in the proposed regulations.
The Office also frequently joins representatives of the largest corporations and trade 
groups in meetings with OIRA officials to push for rule changes that would benefit large 
businesses.  For example, in July of 2010 an Office of Advocacy official attended a meeting 
with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and 
the National Association of Home Builders to try to push OIRA to block OSHA’s 300 log 
MSD column rule.57  In October of 2006 an Office of Advocacy official attended a meeting 
with ExxonMobil, the American Chemistry Council, and Bayer Corporation to push for 
changes to the EPA’s pending rule to revise its definition of solid waste under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act.58
In many cases, weaker regulatory requirements for large firms can actually have the perverse 
effect of harming small businesses—rather than helping them—and thus directly conflicts 
with the Office’s mission.  Regulatory subsidies for large firms can make it even more difficult 
for small businesses to remain competitive, inhibiting people’s ability to start these firms and 
sustain them over the long run. 
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Helping Small Businesses While Promoting 
Public Health and Safety: It’s Time to Reform 
the Office of Advocacy
A New Mission: Promoting Win-Win Regulatory Solutions
The role of the Office of Advocacy should be to develop “win-win” regulatory solutions that 
help small businesses meet the high regulatory standards needed to protect public health 
and safety, instead of lowering those standards for them.  In other words, the Office should 
seek to protect small businesses “competitiveness” without undermining public health and 
safety.  In many cases, the costs of complying with regulations can put small businesses at 
a competitive disadvantage with larger businesses, which are better equipped to pass many 
of these costs along to their consumers.  Larger businesses are also able to afford attorneys, 
engineers, accountants, and other compliance consultants, who can help them devise cheaper 
ways to fulfill regulatory requirements.
Providing small businesses with preferential regulatory treatment helps them remain 
competitive with larger firms, but it comes at the expense of public health and safety.  In 
effect, preferential regulatory treatment subsidizes small businesses by passing on to the 
public the socially harmful impacts of their activities, such as air and water pollution, 
hazardous working conditions, and unreasonably dangerous consumer products.  In contrast, 
the Office’s current approach of working to reduce regulatory burdens across the board for 
all firms reduces regulatory impacts on small businesses, but does nothing to promote small 
business competitiveness.  This approach also likely undermines regulatory safeguards more 
severely than would an approach that merely focuses on providing preferential regulatory 
treatment to small businesses alone.
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Fortunately, if the public agrees that small businesses need to be subsidized, policymakers 
have an alternative strategy:  They can promote small business competitiveness by 
affirmatively helping them to meet effective public health and safety standards.  The Office 
should use its role in the regulatory process to explore and promote creative solutions for 
achieving this goal.  Such creative solutions could include:
•	 Providing monetary assistance to truly small businesses so that they can meet 
higher regulatory standards. Monetary assistance could include direct subsidies 
to cover part or all of the costs of equipment upgrades required for regulatory 
compliance.  Alternatively, the Office could work to obtain subsidized loans to help 
small businesses defray regulatory compliance costs.
•	 Expanding regulatory compliance assistance programs.  SBREFA established 
several compliance assistance programs, including requiring agencies to produce 
“compliance guides” for each of their rules that have a significant impact on small 
businesses.59  These compliance guides describe the rule and explain what actions 
small businesses need to take to comply.  Congress can help improve the effectiveness 
of compliance guides by providing agencies with full funding to produce and 
distribute them.  In addition, Congress can establish local offices throughout 
the country staffed with compliance consultants that can help small businesses 
understand their obligations under different regulations.  To be effective, Congress 
must ensure that the network of compliance consultant offices is fully funded.
•	 Partnering small businesses to promote beneficial synergies on regulatory 
compliance.  The Office could explore different ways of partnering small businesses 
that will help them meet regulatory obligations in mutually beneficial ways.  For 
example, the Office could help establish a cooperative of small businesses within a 
given location, which could share the cost of compliance assistance services, such 
as those provided by accountants or engineering consultants.  Alternatively, the 
Office could establish partnerships that build off the Small Business Administration’s 
(SBA) preferential government procurement and contracting policies for helping 
small businesses.  For example, if a small business requires special services, such 
as accounting, to comply with a regulation, then the Office could explore ways to 
partner that business with another small firm that provides those special services.  In 
this way, the Office can assure that one small business’s compliance with regulations 
help to create a profitable market for another small business.
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To achieve these reforms, Congress will need to:
•	 Amend the primary statutory authorities under which the Office operates (P. Law. 
94-305 and Reg-Flex) to replace their focus on reducing small businesses’ regulatory 
costs with a new focus on promoting win-win regulatory solutions that ensure small 
business competitiveness without undermining public health and safety;
•	 Expand the Office’s legal authority as necessary to enable it to explore and promote 
win-win regulatory alternatives that help small businesses meet high regulatory 
standards while maintaining competitiveness;
•	 Provide the SBA with additional legal authorities to establish and implement new 
win-win regulatory subsidy programs that affirmatively assist small businesses remain 
competitive while meeting high regulatory standards;
•	 Establish and fully fund a network of small business regulatory compliance assistance 
offices; and
•	 Increase agency budgets so that they are able to carry out Reg-Flex analyses and 
compliance assistance guides without displacing critical resources needed to advance 
their statutory mission of protecting public health, safety, and the environment.
In addition, the Office will need to:
•	 Significantly overhaul its Reg-Flex compliance guide for agencies, so that it helps 
them to work toward creative win-win regulatory solutions that enable small 
businesses to remain competitive while meeting high regulatory standards and
•	 Work with small businesses to develop and promote win-win regulatory solutions 
in comments on proposed regulations, SBREFA panels, lawsuits, and sponsored 
research.  SBREFA panels in particular will be critical for gathering the unique views 
of small businesses for identifying how pending regulations might inhibit their ability 
to compete and for developing innovative solutions for helping these firms to meet 
high regulatory standards while remaining competitive.
Finally, the President should revoke Executive Order 13272.  Given its strong anti-regulatory 
culture, OIRA is unlikely to provide the Office with much assistance in identifying ways to 
help small businesses meet regulatory standards needed to protect public health, safety, and 
the environment.  Instead, OIRA will likely continue to push the Office to weaken agency 
rules, even where potential win-win regulatory solutions are appropriate and available. 
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Restored Focus: Helping Truly Small Businesses Only
The Office of Advocacy has become a potent anti-regulatory force, working to block, delay, 
and dilute all regulations, even those that do not have a clear impact on small businesses.  
Whatever the policy goals are that might justify shielding small businesses from fulfilling 
their regulatory obligations, they certainly do not extend to larger businesses.  Accordingly, 
the Office should restrict its actions to helping truly small businesses only.
To accomplish this goal, Congress will need to do the following:
•	 Enact legislation that revises the SBA’s small business size standards.  The new size 
standards should define a small business as any firm with 20 or fewer employees—
regardless of which industry the firm is in—rather than basing the definition on the 
relative size of different firms within each given industry, as the current size standards 
do.  This revision would not only better align the regulatory definition for small 
business with the popular understanding of that term, it would better effectuate the 
policy goals that the government seeks to achieve by providing truly small businesses 
with preferential regulatory treatment.  In addition, the small size standards should 
exclude certain industrial categories that pose an inherently high risk to public health 
and safety, such as the dry cleaning industry.  Businesses in these exempted industrial 
categories should not qualify for win-win regulatory subsidy programs, even if they 
have 20 or fewer employers, because their activities are too harmful to public health 
and safety.
•	 Enact legislation that prohibits large corporate interests from participating in or 
using small business surrogates to participate in SBREFA panels.  To participate 
in SBREFA panels, a business must first qualify as a small business under the revised 
small business size standard.  To make this mandate enforceable, the law should 
further require all businesses that participate in SBREFA panels to certify that they 
both meet the revised small business standard and are not acting as agents for any 
business or trade group that does not meet the revised small business standard.  
Congress should declare that making a false statement in this certification is a crime 
under 18 U.S.C. §1001.  Furthermore, Congress should bar for at least three years 
any business that makes a false statement in the certification from participating in 
any future SBREFA panels and from qualifying for any win-win regulatory subsidy 
programs established and implemented either by the Office or by the SBA.
•	 Conduct more frequent and thorough oversight.  The House and Senate 
committees with primary jurisdiction over the Office—presently, the House 
Small Business Committee and the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship 
Committee—should endeavor to conduct at least one oversight hearing for the Office 
every year.  One of the goals of these oversight committee hearings should be to 
ensure that the Office is limiting its activities to helping only businesses that meet the 
revised small business size standard.
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Again, the President can reinforce these reforms by revoking Executive Order 13272.  
Because OIRA has such a strong anti-regulatory culture, any continued collaboration with 
OIRA will likely encourage the Office to continue working to block, delay, and dilute 
regulations for businesses not meeting the revised small business size standard.
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1Executive Summary
 This report examines the activities of an independent office within the Small Business 
Administration: the Office of Advocacy.  The Office of Advocacy has responsibility for ensuring 
that federal agencies evaluate the small business impacts of the rules they adopt.  Scientific 
assessments are not “rules” and do not regulate small business, yet the Office of Advocacy decided 
to comment on technical, scientific assessments of the cancer risks of formaldehyde, styrene, and 
chromium.  By its own admission, Advocacy lacks the scientific expertise to evaluate the merits of 
such assessments.
The report analyzes correspondence and materials received through a Freedom of 
Information Act request made by staff at the Center for Effective Government.  Our inquiry 
was driven by two questions:  Why did the Office of Advocacy get involved in the debate over 
scientific assessments that do not regulate small business?  Whose interests does the Office of 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration actually serve?
We found that the Office of Advocacy’s comments on these assessments raised no issues 
of specific concern to small business and relied almost exclusively on talking points provided by 
trade associations dominated by big chemical companies.  Between 2005 and 2012, the American 
Chemistry Council (ACC) and its members spent over $333 million lobbying Congress and 
federal agencies on, among other things, a protracted campaign to prevent government agencies 
from designating formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium as carcinogens.  The Formaldehyde 
Council, Styrene Industry Research Council, and Chrome Coalition spent millions more.  These 
groups asked the Office of Advocacy for assistance, and the Office became their willing partner.
We conclude that the Office of Advocacy’s decision to comment on scientific assessments 
of the cancer risks of certain chemicals constitutes a significant and unwarranted expansion of 
its role and reach beyond its statutory responsibilities.  We recommend that Congress ask the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate the Office of Advocacy and exert more 
rigorous oversight of its activities to ensure its work does not undermine the efforts of other 
federal agencies to fulfill the goals Congress has assigned them.
Key Findings:
	The Office of Advocacy hosts regular Environmental Roundtables attended by trade 
association representatives and lobbyists.  The discussions and minutes are kept secret, 
although the consensus positions that emerge appear to inform the Office of Advocacy’s 
policy positions.  These meetings violate the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act.
2	The Office of Advocacy staff made no effort to educate themselves on the science underlying 
the debates about the cancer risks of formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium or to verify the 
accuracy of the talking points provided to them by industry lobbyists before filing comments 
critical of the scientific conclusions in each assessment.  Instead, the Office of Advocacy 
simply repackaged and submitted talking points provided by trade association lobbyists as 
formal comments. 
	Correspondence between the Office of Advocacy and trade associations dominated by large 
chemical companies and their lobbyists suggests the Office became entangled in a major 
lobbying campaign to prevent the federal government from listing certain chemicals as known 
or probable carcinogens.  E-mails suggest the Office of Advocacy may have violated the Anti-
Lobbying Act and other lobbying restrictions.  
	No small businesses objected to the scientific assessments or asked the Office of Advocacy 
to intervene in the cancer assessments.  The Office of Advocacy made no effort to determine 
whether the positions it took represented small business views and interests.  Moreover, since 
small businesses may produce substitutes for toxic chemicals, a cancer finding for existing 
chemicals could open up new markets for substitute chemicals produced by small businesses.  
	No process or procedures seem to be in place to ensure that the activities of the Office of 
Advocacy are consistent with, and do not work to undermine, the statutory responsibilities of 
other agencies. 
Recommendations:
	The Office of Advocacy should limit its work to regulatory activities affecting small business, 
as authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent laws.
	Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the Office of Advocacy’s Environmental 
Roundtables violate Federal Advisory Committee Act provisions.
	The Office of Advocacy should independently verify the factual claims it makes in comments 
to other federal agencies and should not comment on technical or scientific matters on which 
its staff have no expertise.  
	Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the activities of the Office of Advocacy 
represent impermissible lobbying by federal employees. 
	The Office of Advocacy should develop procedures to verify that its policies represent the 
interests of small business.  Its comments should be limited to offering a small business 
perspective that the regulating agency would not otherwise hear. 
3	Congress should exert more rigorous oversight over the Office of Advocacy to ensure its work 
does not delay or prevent other federal agencies from fulfilling their statutory goals, especially 
those scientific and regulatory agencies tasked with protecting the health of the American 
people.
4Introduction
 Americans have long 
championed small businesses.  
According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, about 5,821,277 businesses 
with fewer than 100 employees 
are operating in the U.S. today, 
employing about 35 percent of the 
workforce.1  The federal government 
has been actively supporting small 
businesses since 1953, when the 
Small Business Administration was 
established to provide them with 
subsidized loans and assistance.  
Over the years, survey after survey has shown that a majority of Americans – across the political 
spectrum – believes that government should continue to provide assistance and support to small 
businesses.2  
 Surveys also show broad support for federal efforts to protect public health.3  The public 
expects the government to keep tainted food and medicines off store shelves.  They want cancer-
causing chemicals regulated, air pollution controlled, and the safety of our water supplies ensured. 
In fact, most Americans believe that existing regulations need to be better enforced.4  There is no 
reason that these two popular functions of government should conflict.  
Yet our investigation, based on correspondence and materials provided through Freedom 
of Information Act requests, has unearthed activities by a little-known independent office within 
the Small Business Administration – the Office of Advocacy – that is working to undermine 
efforts by federal scientists to identify public health hazards and ensure that American families 
are protected from cancer-causing substances.  These assessments do not regulate the activities of 
small business and seem far outside the Office’s mission – to represent the views and interests of 
small businesses to other federal agencies. 
1  See Statistics about Business Size (including Small Business), U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2013). 
2  See, e.g., Small Business Majority, Opinion Poll: Small Business Views on Taxes and the Role of Government 
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.smallbusinessmajority.org/small-business-research/taxes/taxes-and-role-of-government.php  (finding 
that “the majority of small businesses believe government can play an effective role in helping small businesses thrive”).     
3  See Coalition for Sensible Safeguards, Summary of Lake Research Partners 2011 Regulatory Research (2011), 
http://www.sensiblesafeguards.org/assets/documents/css-lrp-summary.pdf (summarizing the findings of a national poll conducted 
May 2011).  
4  Id. 
5Specifically, the Office of Advocacy sought to block the publication of scientific 
assessments of the risks of cancer developed by the National Toxicology Program and the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System.  When cancer 
assessments are delayed or stopped, it means more Americans will be exposed to substances that 
can kill.  Delay costs lives. 
Moreover, a recent survey of a representative sample of small business owners (businesses 
with under 100 employees) suggests that the positions taken by the Office of Advocacy do not 
represent the views of the constituency on whose behalf it is supposed to advocate.5  About 60 
percent of small business owners reported that they believe “exposure to toxic chemicals in day-
to-day life” is a very serious or somewhat serious threat today; 75 percent supported “stricter 
regulation of chemicals produced and used in everyday products”; 94 percent said “companies 
using chemicals of concern to human health should disclose their presence to customers and 
the public”; and 92 percent said there should be “a public, easily accessible database identifying 
chemicals of high concern to human and environmental health.”  The survey mirrored the 
demographics of small business owners:  three quarters of the respondents were male; 82 percent 
were white; half identified as Republican and 23 percent as Independents.6 
The activities of the Office of Advocacy described in this report represent an unwarranted 
expansion of its jurisdiction, extending its reach well beyond the statutory responsibilities 
assigned to the Office under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent legislation.  The Office 
of Advocacy operates with little oversight by the Small Business Administration, the White 
House, or Congress.  Its effort to expand its jurisdiction to weigh in on toxic hazards threatens 
important health programs designed to inform the public and federal regulatory agencies about 
health risks.
5  The survey of 511 small business owners found that small business owners (SBOs) generally believe toxic chemicals pose a 
threat to people’s health, and support stricter regulation and greater disclosure of toxic chemicals. The sample was weighted by 
gender, region, ethnicity, industry type, and business size to match the characteristics of small business owners nationally. The 
margin of error for the survey is + or – 4.4%.  Poll of Small Business Owners on Toxic Chemicals, American Sustainable Business 
Council (ASBC) (Sept. 2012), http://asbcouncil.org/node/846. 
6  Id.
61. Federal Government Support for Small Businesses and the 
Office of Advocacy 
Congress established the 
Small Business Administration 
(SBA) as a separate, executive 
branch agency in 1953 to 
provide businesses “which are 
independently owned and operated 
and which are not dominant in their 
field of operation” with financial 
assistance, such as government-backed loans.7  For the next two decades, this cabinet-level agency 
responded to requests for assistance by business. 
In 1974, when Congress amended the Small Business Act, it created the office of Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy within the Small Business Administration “to represent the views and 
interests of small businesses before other Federal agencies whose policies and activities may affect” 
small businesses.8  Two years later, in 1976, the Office of Advocacy became an independent office 
within SBA, headed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy.  The Chief Counsel is appointed by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate.9  As head of an independent office, the Chief Counsel 
is not required to submit his reports and comments to the SBA Administrator or to the White 
House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review or approval.10      
Since the Office was established, its statutory authority has grown.  In 1980, Congress 
passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), which requires every federal agency to assess and 
mitigate the impact of proposed and final rules on small business consistent with its statutory 
mission and gave the Office of Advocacy the responsibility for overseeing agency compliance with 
this new mandate.11 
7  Stephen L. Keleti & Joseph A. Maranto, Planning a Full-Scale Audit of the Small Business Administration, 10 GAO Review 51 
(1975), available at http://archive.gao.gov/otherpdf1/091092.pdf.
8  Small Business Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-386, sec. 10, § 5(e)(4), 88 Stat. 742, 749 (1974), amended by Small 
Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-305, tit. 2, § 201, 90 Stat. 663, 668 (1976) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 634c(4) (2006)).
9  Small Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-305, 90 Stat. 663 (1976) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. § 634a-f (2006)).
10  15 U.S.C. § 634(f). 
11  Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011: 
Annual Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and 
Executive Order 13272, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 
2011], available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/11regflx_0.pdf.
7Congress again expanded its statutory responsibilities in 1996 when it enacted the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).12  Among other provisions, this law 
required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to convene small business review panels for every proposed rule that 
will have a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”13  The head 
of the agency, the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (an office 
within OMB), and Chief Counsel for Advocacy are required to attend each panel and meet with 
representatives of “small entities” to review new rules the agency may propose and the agency’s 
analysis of the impact the rule may have on small businesses. The panel then suggests ways the 
agency can mitigate the impact on small business.  The SBREFA process delays development of 
workplace safety and environmental rules considerably.   
In 2002, President George W. Bush further expanded the Office of Advocacy’s 
responsibilities through Executive Order 13272.14  Under this executive order, all federal agencies 
were required to notify the Office of Advocacy earlier in the rulemaking process of rules 
that could potentially have a significant effect on small businesses. This was intended to give 
agencies more time to adequately consider and respond to comments submitted by the Office of 
Advocacy.15  The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 codified these new requirements.
The Office of Advocacy’s budget for FY 2012 was $9.12 million.  It has a staff of 46.  By 
comparison, OIRA, a key office in OMB responsible for reviewing the rules proposed by all 
executive agencies, had a staff of 45 in FY 2012.16 
As its budget and staff have grown, the Office of Advocacy has moved beyond 
commenting on how regulations impact small business to questioning the merits of scientific 
assessments of toxic hazards.  This substantial expansion of Advocacy’s role is well beyond its 
statutory responsibility or substantive expertise.  
12  Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
13  Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 1–3.  The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 also provided that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau must 
conduct Small Business Advocacy Review (SBAR) panels when proposing economically significant rules.  Id. at 2.
14  Exec. Order No. 13272, 3 C.F.R. 247 (2003), available at http://www.foreffectivegov.org/files/regs/library/eo13272.pdf.
15  Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 2–3.
16  Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Congressional Budget Justification FY 2013, at 6, 
available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/3-508%20Compliant%20FY%202013%20Office%20of%20Advocacy%20
CBJ%281%29.pdf.
82. Protecting the Public from Cancer-causing Chemicals: 
Scientific Assessments of Health Risks
A number of laws have been 
passed directing federal agencies 
to protect the public from health 
hazards and to reduce the cancer 
risks posed by toxic substances.  
For example, the Clean Air Act 
requires EPA to reduce particulates 
in the air based on science showing 
their presence increases the risk 
of respiratory diseases.  Congress 
directed the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC) to ban 
lead in toys after it was shown that 
ingesting lead could cause brain and organ damage in infants.  Congress required the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to ban the use of certain preservatives if they are shown to cause 
cancer.  
However, scientific evidence about the effects of chemicals on human health is cumulative. 
It is rare for a single study or two to provide definitive proof of increased cancer risks.  
Scientists rely on controlled experiments with animals to predict a chemical’s effect in humans.  
Epidemiological studies may indicate, but rarely prove, an association between exposure and 
harm for several reasons.  Epidemiological studies with adequate statistical power to detect small 
increases in common cancers require the collection of data and analysis of effects among large 
groups of exposed people.  They cannot be completed until enough time has passed for latent 
effects to be detected.  And, accurate data on past exposures is rarely available; reconstructed data 
may not accurately reflect past exposures.  Because of this, determining what amount of exposure 
to what chemicals causes cancer inevitably requires scientists to make informed judgments. 
Rather than asking each federal agency tasked with protecting the public’s health to 
conduct its own evaluations of the scientific evidence on carcinogens, several agencies are 
tasked with evaluating  scientific information and disseminating their conclusions to other 
federal agencies and the public.  Two of these programs are the National Toxicology Program 
in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Integrated Risk Information 
System in EPA.  Neither program sets emission standards for chemical discharges or enforces 
health or safety standards later set by other agencies.  Their role is to be an “honest broker” 
of scientific studies.  However, because labeling a substance a cancer-causing agent can have 
adverse consequences in the market and lead to stricter regulation down the road, chemical 
manufacturers watch this process carefully, challenge research findings, and develop their own 
research to promote alternative hypotheses about cancer causation.
9The National Toxicology Program Report on Carcinogens
The Public Health Service Act of 1978 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to prepare a Report on Carcinogens every other year that identifies substances with the potential 
to cause cancer.17  The National Toxicology Program (NTP) prepares the report to be issued on 
behalf of the Secretary of HHS, who then communicates this information to the American people 
to ensure they can make informed decisions about where they live and work. 
The report has two classifications: 54 substances are classified as known to be a human 
carcinogen; 186 substances are classified as reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen.18  A 
substance is known to be a human carcinogen if there is “sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity 
from studies in humans, which indicates a causal relationship between exposure to the agent, 
substance, or mixture, and human cancer.”19  A substance is reasonably anticipated to be a human 
carcinogen if there is some evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in humans, evidence of 
carcinogenicity from animal studies, or other evidence to suggest a substance causes cancer.  The 
Report on Carcinogens only puts substances into these broad categories; it does not quantitatively 
estimate the risk of cancer.  
Because manufacturers fear that classifying a substance as a “known carcinogen” can 
reduce its use, public officials have developed a thorough and scrupulous process for determining 
what substances should be placed on the list.  The NTP permits anyone to suggest a chemical 
should be put on the list, removed, or reclassified.  Once NTP decides to evaluate a nominated 
substance, it conducts a comprehensive review of the evidence of its carcinogenicity.  This draft 
background document is submitted to an expert panel for peer review and is put online to allow 
the public to comment.  After peer review comments are incorporated into a revised report on 
the substance, it is published again, and the public can again comment.  The final background 
document is then further reviewed by two interagency scientific review groups. Taking all 
this feedback into account, NTP prepares a draft “substance profile” and classification listing 
recommendation, which is then reviewed by its own Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC).  The 
BSC solicits comments and holds a public hearing; it then reports on whether the scientific 
information in the draft substance profile is technically correct, clearly stated, and supports the 
classification recommendation.  Only after this process has been completed is the new Report on 
Carcinogens published.20
17  Community Mental Health Centers Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-622, Sec. 262(b)(4), 92 Stat. 3412, 3434-35 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 241(b)(4) (2006)). 
18  Nat’l Toxicology Program, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, The Report on Carcinogens: Key Points; 
12th Edition (2011), available at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/materials/report_on_carcinogens_12th_edition_the_508.pdf.
19  Report on Carcinogens: Listing Criteria, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/?objectid=47B37760-F1F6-975E-
7C15022B9C93B5A6 (last updated June 15, 2011).
20  In fact, the National Toxicology Program revised the procedures for completing the Report on Carcinogens several times 
since 1980 and each time, it has added opportunity for public comment and additional peer review.  
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These procedures mean that a great deal of time is required to complete a new edition of 
the Report on Carcinogens.  Large chemical companies who make the chemicals being evaluated 
and the trade associations of which they are members commented repeatedly on the 12th Report, 
which was published in 2011.  In fact, their comments dominated the debate at NTP over which 
chemicals should be listed as carcinogens.
The Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System Assessments
Another major database of information about chemical toxicity is the Integrated 
Risk Information System (IRIS) at EPA, which contains information on the health effects of 
environmental contaminants.21  IRIS assessments evaluate the scientific data on chemical hazards 
and calculate acceptable exposure levels – the level below which no health effects are expected 
(known as the reference dose or reference concentration in air).  The IRIS reference dose may be 
used by other EPA programs in determining the dose of a chemical to which the public may be 
exposed.  
The IRIS database contains profiles for over 550 chemicals.  Like the NTP Report on 
Carcinogens, the assessments are the result of an extensive, multi-step review process.  A new 
IRIS assessment involves a comprehensive literature review, multiple opportunities for public 
comment, rigorous peer review of draft background documents, and final review by independent 
experts and other agency staff.  The entire process takes at least two years (and often longer).  The 
final IRIS assessment is posted online along with the summary, toxicological review, and EPA 
responses to comments received.  
NTP and IRIS provide citizens with important information about the cancer hazards 
Americans face.  Neither NTP nor IRIS assessments produce rules or regulations that govern 
business activity.  Yet the Office of Advocacy at the SBA intervened in both the NTP and the 
IRIS assessment processes.  We investigated how and why interventions related to three specific 
chemicals – formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium – occurred.
21  Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS): Basic Information, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/
iris/intro.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2012).
11
The Center for Effective Government’s Investigation
 The Center for Effective Government (formerly OMB Watch) filed several Freedom of 
Information Act requests with the Office of Advocacy in the spring of 2012.  One request asked 
for documents relating to Advocacy’s comments on NTP’s 12th Report on Carcinogens and the 
risks posed by formaldehyde and styrene.  Another FOIA request asked for documents relating to 
the Office of Advocacy’s comments on EPA’s IRIS risk assessment for chromium.  Advocacy staff 
forwarded some documents responsive to our request.  After we discovered a number of missing 
documents, staff searched their files again and provided more relevant documents.  Advocacy 
claims the only documents not disclosed were intra- or interagency deliberative documents 
withheld under FOIA exemption 5.22  The Office did not provide the Center for Effective 
Government with a list of withheld documents.
 For each of the three chemical assessments investigated, the debate over the 
carcinogenicity of each substance has been going on for decades and involves complex, technical 
evaluations of toxicological and epidemiological data.  The large manufacturing companies that 
produce these chemicals have spent tens of millions of dollars disputing the scientific evidence 
showing increased cancer risks.  The Office of Advocacy admits it has no scientific expertise in 
this area, yet it chose to intervene in these proceedings.  In each of the cases we examined, we 
asked:
•	 Who asked the Office of Advocacy to intervene in these chemical assessments? 
•	 What efforts did Office of Advocacy staff make to educate themselves on the science 
underlying the debates about the health risks of these chemicals?  
•	 What efforts did the Office of Advocacy make to determine the interests of small 
businesses in these issues (i.e., whether small businesses felt this was a priority for them 
and/or the impact that a cancer designation for these chemicals would have on small 
businesses)?
22  FOIA exemption 5 allows the government to withhold information that concerns communications within or between 
agencies that are protected by legal privileges including the attorney-work product privilege and deliberative process privilege.  See 
Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.gov, http://www.foia.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
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3. The Office of Advocacy’s Interventions in Scientific Debates 
About Public Health and Toxic Chemicals
In each of the cases 
discussed below, a growing body of 
scientific evidence documented the 
cancer risks of the chemical agents.  
But as the research evidence grew, 
so too did the lobbying efforts of 
large producers.  It appears that 
the Office of Advocacy became 
inappropriately and impermissibly 
entangled in these lobbying 
campaigns.  Before moving into 
three case studies of these activities, 
a word is needed about the Office 
of Advocacy’s Roundtables because they seem to play a critical role in shaping the priorities of the 
Office. 
The Roundtables
Our research suggests that the Office of Advocacy began holding regular roundtables on 
different subjects with industry groups around 1990.  According to its reports, “Some roundtables 
have been scheduled as regularly recurring events, such as Advocacy’s monthly roundtable 
on environmental rules and Advocacy’s occupational safety roundtable, which is generally 
bimonthly.  Other roundtables, such as those concerning transportation and homeland security, 
have been held quarterly, while still others have been held on an ad hoc basis.”23 
The Office of Advocacy issues the invitations to its roundtables, which are usually held 
at the law offices of a firm representing a participating trade association.  From correspondence 
and reports we have obtained,24 it seems that trade association representatives and lobbyists 
sometimes directly ask to give presentations at the roundtables.25  In other cases, Advocacy staff 
have worked with trade association staff to plan presentations, asking for input on the agenda, the 
presenters, and the title.26 
23  Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2008: 
Annual Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and 
Executive Order 13272, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/08regflx.pdf.
24  The Office of Advocacy provided the environmental roundtable e-mail list, although it is not the most current version and 
some e-mails may have changed in the past six months.  We were given presentations for the environmental roundtable on July 
29, 2011 at which representatives from the American Composite Manufacturers Association and Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers 
Association made presentations.  Other miscellaneous roundtable documents were provided as well.
25  E-mail from Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC, to Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy (Mar. 16, 2011) (“I 
spoke to Ann earlier this week about presenting the Cr6 research at your upcoming roundtable.  Did she indicate she would like to 
be part of the program?”).
26  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Charlie Grizzle, lobbyiest for the Formaldehyde Council, and Jim 
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Most attendees at the roundtables represent trade associations that have large corporate 
members, as well as small business members.  Advocacy does not require that attendees 
represent small businesses.  In one e-mail, a staff member at the Office of Advocacy told a 
lobbyist for General Electric that he was invited to attend a Labor Safety roundtable as long as he 
“maintain[ed] a small business perspective!  ;-)”27  Several small business groups perceived to be 
liberal or aligned with Democrats were not on the e-mail invitation lists for roundtables held in 
2010 and 2011.28  
The discussions at the roundtables are closed to the press, and participants are told 
they cannot publicly comment on the discussions.29  Any party may report to its membership 
what it said, but participants are asked not to report what other participants say or to repeat 
what representatives of the Office of Advocacy say.  Our investigation suggests that Advocacy’s 
positions on policy issues grow out of the discussion at these roundtables. 
  The documents from the roundtables obtained through our Freedom of Information 
Act requests and interviews conducted with participants suggest that presentations on the 
three chemical assessments were dominated by the interests of large chemical manufacturers.  
The presentations strongly criticized the science showing cancer risks; no competing views 
were presented.  Nor was there an effort to determine how cancer assessments may impact 
small businesses within a certain industry or whether such an assessment might open 
markets for substitute chemicals.  The assumption seems to be that a cancer assessment that 
adversely affects a big chemical company will adversely affect small businesses.  From the 
materials we were provided and from interviews, we found no evidence that “[s]mall business 
representatives” initiated conversation at the roundtables  on “the difficulties posed by chemical 
risk characterizations at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and at the 
Environmental Protection Agency”30 as the Office of Advocacy later claimed.
Skillen, Dir., RISE, cc: Jane C. Luxton, Attorney, Pepper Hamilton, LLP (June 25, 2010) (Subject line: Draft Roundtable Notice_
please review) (“Jane, Charlie – you can decide if I should list both of you or just Charlie.  Also, Charlie, I would be interested in 
a formaldehyde update also – if you could handle it.  I would list that separately. . . . Jim – we can add an additional speaker with 
you if you like.  Please review the time frames also.”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to David Fischer, ACC, Ann Mason, ACC, 
and John Schweitzer, ACMA (June 28, 2011) (“I’m thinking of two presenters on the NTP process for styrene and formaldehyde 
– and to contrast this process with the IRIS risk assessment process, and the merits of the science controversies – for an hour 
slot on the 29th.  Thoughts?”); E-mail from David Fischer to Kevin L. Bromberg, Ann Mason, and John Schweitzer (July 6, 2011) 
(“Kevin, I think discussing NTP process would be very worthwhile but not sure two talks would be necessary since the flaws in 
the formaldehyde process were also apparent in styrene’s as well.  I’m wondering if we want to discuss the larger issue of rampant 
redundancy and inconsistency in hazard/risk assessment within the federal govt.  In particular, is the RoC still relevant?  Thanks.”); 
E-mail from John Schweitzer to Kevin L. Bromberg (July 11, 2011) (“We’ve got a toxicologist standing by for the July 29 SBA 
Roundtable. . . .”); E-mail from John Schweitzer to Kevin L. Bromberg (July 22, 2011) (“I will likely present the styrene issue next 
week, instead of Jim Bus.  Since NTP is not participating, we don’t need to employ our big ‘science guns’.”); E-mail from Kevin L. 
Bromberg to David Fischer and John Schweitzer (July 12, 2011) (asking for suggestions for the title of Advocacy’s environmental 
roundtable scheduled for July 29th, 2011 and offering three titles for consideration).
27  E-mail from Bruce E. Lundegren, Office of Advocacy, to Pat K. Casano, General Electric (Jan. 10, 2011).
28  After testifying at a joint hearing before the House Science Committee and Small Business Committee on April 25, 2012, 
American Sustainable Business Council was invited to attend the Environmental Roundtables.
29  See E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to John Schweitzer, ACMA (Aug. 1, 2011).  In editing a press 
release for ACMA, Mr. Bromberg wrote “we prefer that we stick to what was presented at the Roundtable – and not a reference 
to the discussion at the Roundtable- which we try to keep confidential to aid in having an open discussion (see the bottom of all 
Roundtable notices). Participants are free, however, to make known their own comments.” 
30  Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 5. 
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When a federal agency relies on a group of outside advisors to formulate policy, the 
process is supposed to be governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).31  This law is 
designed to “limit the influence of special interests” in the public policy decision making process.  
The law requires that meetings of advisory groups be open to the public and that advisory 
committees be balanced. 
The Office of Advocacy’s roundtables may represent improperly constituted advisory 
committees.  Advocacy invites a group of private citizens to regularly meet and solicits their input 
on policy positions.  The Office of Advocacy appears to rely on the “consensus views” expressed 
during these meetings to formulate the positions it takes.  Yet Advocacy conducts the roundtables 
behind closed doors and does not disclose records of what is said.  Clearly, the roundtables are 
incompatible with the goals of FACA. 
The Formaldehyde War
Formaldehyde is a colorless, flammable, strong-smelling chemical that is used as 
an adhesive, disinfectant, and preservative.  It is found in the home in products such as 
particleboard, plywood, and glues.  Exposure to formaldehyde can cause sensory and skin 
irritation and chemical sensitivity.  Workers who produce or use formaldehyde are exposed to 
greater levels than the general public.32  In 1981, formaldehyde was listed as reasonably anticipated 
to be a human carcinogen in the NTP Report on Carcinogens.  
The early evidence of the relationship between formaldehyde and cancer actually came 
from the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology (CIIT), a research group founded by 11 
large chemical companies.33  In 1979, it reported that rats exposed to formaldehyde contracted 
cancer.  Shortly after this finding, and a strategy memo put out by a Georgia-Pacific health 
and safety official,34 the CIIT shifted its focus to conducting research showing that humans 
metabolize formaldehyde differently than rats, so that given the same level of exposure, people 
absorb less formaldehyde than rats.  Risk assessments based on actual cancer incidence among 
formaldehyde-exposed workers show risks 50 times higher than those predicted by CIIT’s 
models.35  A lobbying effort to block the regulation of formaldehyde as a cancer-causing substance 
was funded by the Formaldehyde Institute.
31  FACA rules apply when an assemblage of individuals that includes at least one non-federal employee (a) is working as a 
group and (b) is “established or utilized” by agency (c) to provide “advice or recommendations” to the agency.  5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 
3(2) (2006).  
32  See generally Formaldehyde and Cancer Risk, Nat’l Cancer Institute, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/
formaldehyde (last reviewed June 10, 2011); Formaldehyde, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
topics/formaldehyde/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2012).
33  Dan Fagin et al., Toxic Deception: How the Chemical Industry Manipulates Science, Bends the Law, and 
Endangers Your Health 47 (1996).
34  Georgia-Pacific, a subsidiary of Koch Industries, is one of the country’s top producers of formaldehyde.  Other large chemical 
companies who have been active in the fight include Cleanese, Dupont, and other members of the now-defunct Formaldehyde 
Institute.  See Formaldehyde Added to “Known Carcinogens” List Despite Lobbying by Koch Brothers, Chemical Industry, Democracy 
Now (June 14, 2011), available at http://ec.libsyn.com/p/8/5/6/8565271316161e75/dn2011-0614-1.mp3?d13a76d516d9dec20c3d27
6ce028ed5089ab1ce3dae902ea1d01cd8032d8ce5c4d5e&c_id=3325818; Laurie Bennett, The Mighty Formaldehyde Lobby, Muckety 
(Oct. 7, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://news.muckety.com/2012/10/07/the-mighty-formaldehyde-lobby/38441.
35  Fagin et al., supra note 33, at 76.  
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Based on the NTP assessment in 1981, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) sought to regulate workplace exposure to formaldehyde.  Industry 
opposition was so intense that a new exposure limit was only published in response to a court 
order.36  OSHA’s final standard, not issued until 1987, fully considered, and rejected, the industry 
theory; instead, OSHA concluded that formaldehyde posed a significant cancer risk to exposed 
workers.37 
EPA also set out to evaluate formaldehyde’s risks.  In the 1980s, its risk assessment 
accepted the industry theory that formaldehyde posed little cancer risk to humans,38 even though 
EPA’s own Science Advisory Board warned the agency against this approach in 1992.39
Over the past two decades, a growing body of human epidemiology studies has 
consistently shown upper airway and blood cancers among workers exposed to formaldehyde.  
In fact, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) designated formaldehyde a 
“probable human carcinogen” as early as 1987 and in 2006 concluded that there is “sufficient 
evidence in humans” that formaldehyde causes cancer of the nasal passages and “strong but not 
sufficient” evidence for a causal association between leukemia and formaldehyde.40 
By 2008, a paper by EPA concluded that the industry risk model showing minimal human 
risk was “unsupportable.”41  As a result, EPA revised its formaldehyde risk assessment in 2009, 
concluding, as had IARC, that formaldehyde is known to cause cancer of the nasal passages and 
leukemia.  
36  UAW v. Donovan, 756 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
37  UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  Although both OSHA and the courts rejected the formaldehyde 
industry’s self-serving interpretation of the chemical’s cancer risk, economists at OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) accepted it.  OIRA repeatedly cited OSHA’s formaldehyde standard as a rule with large costs but few benefits.  
OIRA’s analysis of the costs and benefits of formaldehyde regulation has been thoroughly discredited.  See Lisa Heinzerling, 
Regulatory Costs of Mythical Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998).
38  See Fagin et al., supra note 33, at 89–91.  
39  Id. at 73.
40  Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Formaldehyde, 2-Butoxyethanol and 1-tert-Butoxypropan-2-ol, 88 IARC 
Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (2006), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/
Monographs/vol88/mono88.pdf. 
41  Franklin Mirer, Risky Business: Forming Your Opinion Regarding Cancer and Formaldehyde, The Synergist, Apr. 2009, at 32 
(quoting Kenny S. Crump et al., Sensitivity Analysis of Biologically Motivated Model for Formaldehyde-Induced Respiratory Cancer 
in Humans, 52:6 Annals of Occupational Hygiene 481 (2008)).
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Producers immediately began a campaign to block the new IRIS risk assessment.  Initially, 
the Formaldehyde Institute led the fight against designating formaldehyde as a carcinogen, but 
it disbanded in 1993 after documents showing the industry’s research strategy of obfuscating 
formaldehyde’s risks were produced during discovery in a lawsuit seeking damages for illnesses 
caused by formaldehyde exposure.  The Formaldehyde Council assumed its role as the dominant 
industry trade association in 1995.  It was dominated by big chemical companies that were 
manufacturing formaldehyde.42  In 2010, it ceased operations at the same time that the American 
Chemistry Council (ACC) formed a Formaldehyde Panel funded by Georgia-Pacific (owned by 
Koch Industries) and Hexion Specialty Chemicals.43  Beginning in 2010, efforts to block the IRIS 
and NTP assessments of formaldehyde, at federal agencies and in Congress, were led by lobbyists 
for the ACC.
Sen. David Vitter (R-LA) put a hold on an EPA nominee until the agency asked the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the IRIS formaldehyde risk assessment shortly 
after a lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council held a fundraiser on the senator’s behalf.44  Koch 
Industries and a Formaldehyde Council lobbyist also gave generous campaign contributions to 
other senators leading the effort to delay the assessment.45  Responding to this political pressure, 
EPA requested the review, which NAS published in April 2011.46  The NAS review affirmed EPA’s 
conclusion that formaldehyde was a known human carcinogen, causing upper airway cancers, but 
directed EPA to restate its reasons for concluding that formaldehyde caused leukemia in humans.  
EPA has not released revisions to its formaldehyde IRIS assessment since the NAS review was 
completed.
42  The by-laws of the Formaldehyde Council require that members of the Board of Directors represent Tier 1 members of 
the Council.  Companies must pay $200,000 to become Tier 1 members, so it is unlikely that many small businesses sat on the 
Formaldehyde Council’s governing body.
43 See ACC Forms New Formaldehyde Panel, American Chemistry Council, http://www.americanchemistry.com/11312.
44  Joaquin Sapien, How Senator Vitter Battled the EPA over Formaldehyde’s Link to Cancer, ProPublica (Apr. 15, 2010, 2:30 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-senator-david-vitter-battled-formaldehyde-link-to-cancer.
45  Id. (linking Koch Industries and Charles Grizzle, a lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council, to campaign contributions to 
Sens. Inhofe and Vitter).
46  Committee to Review EPA’s Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde, Nat’l Research Council, Review of the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde (2011), available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=13142.  Industry interprets the NAS report as critical of EPA’s risk assessment; environmental groups 
such as Natural Resources Defense Council interpret the report as questioning EPA’s discussion of how formaldehyde causes blood 
cancers, without disagreeing with its conclusion that formaldehyde is carcinogenic. 
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At HHS, NTP responded to the IARC listing and 
new research by proposing to move formaldehyde from 
an “anticipated” human carcinogen to a “known human 
carcinogen,” causing upper airway cancers and leukemia, 
as they prepared the 12th Report on Carcinogens.  The 
Formaldehyde Council and the ACC strongly objected, 
filing multiple comments with NTP.  Industry demanded 
that NTP incorporate the NAS analysis of the IRIS risk 
assessment into its evaluation, which it did.  But the ACC 
and Dow Chemical continued to lobby Congress to delay 
publication of the Report on Carcinogens until another NAS review was conducted.47  Republican 
House representatives unsuccessfully pushed an appropriations rider to delay the Report’s 
release.48 
Advocacy Involvement
The Office of Advocacy waded into the debate in November 2011 with formal comments 
claiming that “[s]mall businesses have taken issue with . . . formaldehyde’s listing as ‘known to be 
a human carcinogen’” and that they were “concerned with the quality of scientific analysis” relied 
upon by NTP.49 
Our review of the materials gathered from 
our Freedom of Information Act request shows no 
documents from any small businesses asking the Office 
of Advocacy to intervene in the formaldehyde listing, 
nor did any small business file comments with NTP 
criticizing its analysis.50  Instead, internal Advocacy 
documents show that Advocacy communicated regularly 
with registered lobbyists for the Formaldehyde Council 
and ACC.51  
47  See Jennifer Sass, Health Scientists Sign on to Tell Congress Not to Strip Funding for the Report on Carcinogens, Switchboard: 
Natural Resources Defense Council Staff Blog (Sept. 5, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jsass/health_scientists_sign_on_
to_t.html.
48  Committee on Appropriations, 112th Congress, Working Bill on Appropriations for Departments of Labor, 
Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies FY 2013, (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://
appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-112hr-sc-ap-fy13-laborhhsed.pdf.
49  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of 
Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Nov. 22, 2011), http://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Advocacy_Comment_Letter-Report_On_Carcinogens.pdf.
50  The only comments NTP received were from trade associations, large chemical companies, consulting firms, and 
academic and research institutions.  See Formaldehyde [CAS No. 50-00-0], Public Comments: Substances Newly Reviewed 
for the 12th RoC, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=20A477F2-F1F6-975E-
7472FC6B0DA56D9C#formaldehyde (last updated July 19, 2012).  
51  See E-mails between Kevin Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, and Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC (May 2011); 
E-mails between Kevin Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, and Charles Grizzle, registered lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council 
(June-Aug. 2010).   
“I guess he’s essentially 
wrong. It’s probably better 
for now that I keep the NTP 
contact in the dark.”
-e-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, to 
David Fischer, ACC
“NTP Excerpt – What is the 
detailed industry argument 
that this is incorrect?” 
-e-mail subject line from Kevin L. 
Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to 
Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist 
for ACC
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Moreover, documents show that the Office of Advocacy made no effort to evaluate the 
scientific evidence behind the NTP assessment.  Instead, Advocacy asked lobbyists for ACC to 
provide a “detailed industry” rebuttal to NTP.52  In May 2011, Advocacy staff followed up with 
ACC and its lobbyists about their meetings with agency officials regarding formaldehyde.53  
Advocacy also collaborated on press strategy with ACC54 and discussed whether and when to 
share materials with agency staff.55 
Styrene Skirmishes
Styrene is a clear, liquid, volatile organic compound used predominantly in the 
manufacture of plastics and rubber.56  Synthetic styrene derived from oil and natural gas is 
most commonly found in carpet backing, fiberglass composites (e.g., bathtubs and kitchen 
countertops), and even in polystyrene food containers.  Styrene may be released into the 
environment during manufacture, use, or disposal, contaminating air and drinking water. 
As far back as 1988, studies showed styrene caused cancer in laboratory mice.57  Human 
studies in the years since have suggested that occupational exposure to styrene can lead to 
increased risk of lymphomas, leukemia, and pancreatic or esophageal cancers.58  The IARC has 
listed styrene as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” since 2002.59  Growing evidence from animal 
studies and limited evidence of cancer risks among workers caused NTP to propose listing 
styrene as “reasonably anticipated” to cause cancer in its 12th Report on Carcinogens.  
52  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC, and cc: David 
Fischer, ACC (May 25, 2011). The e-mail contained the subject line, “NTP Excerpt – What is the detailed industry argument that 
this is incorrect?”
53  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC (May 24, 2011) 
(“News from the meeting?”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to David Fischer, ACC (May 24, 3011) (“Was 
there an ACC meeting today with HHS? Any news?”).
54  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to David Fischer, ACC, and Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for 
ACC (May 25, 2011) (Kevin Bromberg: “Will the news about an RoC delay get into the press? Do you want it there?”). 
55  E-mail from David Fischer, ACC, to Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy (May 25, 2011) (David Fischer: “Who at NTP 
were you thinking of sharing it with? John Bucher of NTP essentially told House committee staff that the NRC’s report was not 
relevant to the NTP RoC.”); E-mail reply from Kevin L. Bromberg to David Fischer (May 25, 2011) (Kevin Bromberg: “I guess he’s 
essentially wrong. It’s probably better for now that I keep the NTP contact in the dark.”).
56  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Toxicological Profile 
for Styrene 1–8 (2010), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp53.pdf; Nat’l Toxicology Program, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Services, Styrene: Key Points (June 2011), available at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/materials/
styrene_508.pdf; Frequently Asked Questions, Styrene Info. & Res. Center, http://www.styrene.org/faq.html#one (last visited Jan. 7, 
2013).
57  Barbara Conti et al., Long-Term Carcinogenicity Bioassays on Styrene Administered by Inhalation, Ingestion and Injection and 
Styrene Oxide Administered by Ingestion in Sprague-Dawley Rats, and Para-Methylstyrene Administered by Ingestion in Sprague-
Dawley Rats and Swiss Mice, 534 Annals of the N.Y. Acad. of Sci. 203–34 (1988).
58  Nat’l Toxicology Program, supra note 50. 
59  Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Some Traditional Herbal Medicines, Some Mycotoxins, Napthalene, and 
Styrene, 82 IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans 437–522 (2002), available at http://
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol82/mono82.pdf.
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Not surprisingly, companies producing styrene vigorously disputed its danger to humans.  
Like formaldehyde producers, they argued that humans metabolize the toxin differently than 
animals, so higher exposures are less toxic to people than to laboratory mice.  The Styrene 
Information and Research Council (SIRC) spent over $20 million on 47 studies examining the 
health and environmental effects of styrene exposure; none found clear cancer risks.60  Yet other 
evidence tells a different story.61 
In fact, OSHA has regulated styrene’s “narcotic” health effects on workers since 1971.62  By 
1989, with evidence of cancer risks increasing, OSHA proposed to revisit its limits on permissible 
exposure to styrene.63  But industry associations strongly objected to OSHA characterizing styrene 
as carcinogenic, arguing there was insufficient data to support such a classification.64  OSHA 
backed down; its final rule reducing styrene exposure, later overturned in court, relied only on 
“its narcotic effects” as justification.65  
In 1998, SIRC convinced EPA to allow SIRC to conduct the IRIS hazard assessment of 
styrene.66  The industry assessment was of such poor quality that it was unusable.  However, the 
tactic delayed EPA’s IRIS assessment update of the cancer risks of styrene for some time.67 
60  Summary of SIRC-Supported Research, Styrene Info. & Res. Center, http://www.styrene.org/science/research_summary.html 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
61  See supra notes 57–59.
62  Air Contaminants, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 tbl. Z-1 (1999).
63  The update was referred to by OSHA as the PEL project and OSHA sought to substitute outdated consensus standards, first 
adopted by the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) in the 1960s, with consensus standards 
current in the late 1980s.  Final Rule, Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332–2983 (Jan. 19, 1989), revoked 58 Fed. Reg. 35338–
35351 (June 30, 1993).
64  Letter from John B. Jenks, Chairman, Styrene Info. & Research Ctr. et al., to Joseph A. Dear, Assistant Sec’y of Occupational 
Safety & Health, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Jan. 30, 1996), available at http://www.acmanet.org/ga/osha_styrene_agreement_docs_1996.
pdf. 
65  OSHA’s PEL update was invalidated by the 11th Circuit.  AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992); see also 
Revocation of Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 35338–35351 (June 30, 1993).
66  See Jennifer Sass & Daniel Rosenberg, Natural Resources Defense Council, The Delay Game: How the 
Chemical Industry Ducks Regulation of the Most Toxic Substances 15 (2011), available at http://www.nrdc.org/health/
files/IrisDelayReport.pdf.
67  Id. at 16.
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Since styrene was nominated for inclusion in the 12th Report on Carcinogens in 2004, 
SIRC filed 22 comments arguing against listing the substance.68  As the Report neared publication, 
the industry group doubled its lobbying expenditures, increasing its funding from $200,000 in 
2010 to over $400,000 in 2011.69  Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA), Rep. John Shadegg (R-AZ), and 34 
other members of Congress sent a letter to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius criticizing the NTP 
assessment of styrene’s risks,70 and the American Composite Manufacturers Association (ACMA) 
campaigned “aggressively to overturn the NTP listing.”71  When the Report on Carcinogens was 
finally released on June 10, 2011, it listed styrene as “reasonably anticipated” to cause cancer.  The 
same day, SIRC and Dart Corporation filed suit challenging this assessment of styrene’s risks.72
Dow Chemical is a founding member of SIRC.  Two of the association’s websites are 
registered to the Management Informations Systems Director at the American Chemistry 
Council.  SIRC’s offices, coincidentally, were in the same location in Arlington, VA, as those of the 
Formaldehyde Council.  And one of its lobbying firms also lobbied for ACC, while another of its 
firms lobbied for Dow Chemical.
Advocacy Involvement 
The Office of Advocacy was asked by lobbyists from SIRC and ACMA to comment on 
the NTP assessment of styrene and did so.  A consultant from a lobbying firm hired by SIRC first 
contacted the Office of Advocacy on June 4, 2010, regarding the styrene listing under review for 
the 12th Report on Carcinogens.73  Following that contact, the same consultant helped ACMA 
representatives plan a meeting with Advocacy on Sept. 15, 2010, to discuss ACMA’s concerns 
about the styrene assessment.74  
68  Intervenor-Defendants’ Reply in Support of Defendants’ & Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 6, Styrene Info. & 
Research Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 11-1079 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2012).
69  SIRC’s lobbying expenditures had been minimal before 2010.  Lobbying: Styrene Information and Research Center (2011), 
Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000057259&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 7, 
2012); Lobbying: Styrene Information and Research Center (2010), Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=D000057259&year=2010 (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
70  Letter from Rep. Rick Boucher and Rep. John Shadegg et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Apr. 21, 2010) (requesting that the listing of styrene be deferred for review until the 13th 
Report on Carcinogens).
71  ACMA Continues Fight on NTP Styrene Listing, Am. Composites Manufacturers Ass’n (ACMA), http://www.acmanet.org/
ga/styrene.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).  ACMA had lobbying expenses relating to NTP of at least $56,000 in 2010 and $70,000 in 
2011.  Lobbying: American Composites Manufacturers Assn (2011), Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=D000023940&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 7, 2013); Lobbying: American Composites Manufacturers Assn (2010), 
Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000023940&year=2010 (last visited Jan. 7, 
2013).
72  Complaint, Styrene Info. & Research Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 11-1079 (D.D.C. June 10, 2011), available at http://www.
styrene.org/news/pdfs/06-10-11-SIRCvSebeliusComplaint.pdf.
73  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Kevin L. Bromberg (June 4, 2010) (attaching letters sent by the Styrene Information and 
Research Council and members of Congress to the Secretary of Health and Human Services requesting that the styrene listing be 
deferred and re-reviewed in the 13th Report on Carcinogens).
74  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 14, 2010) (sending over the list of attendees for the meeting); 
E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010) (attaching the ACMA Issue Summary in advance of the 
meeting outlining ACMA’s “previous efforts to ask NTP to review all of the data . . . .”). 
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At the meeting, directors of ACMA or its lobbyists asked Advocacy to schedule an 
interagency meeting with the Office of Management and Budget and NTP to discuss the 
assessment and to submit a request to Sebelius asking her to drop the styrene listing.75  After a 
second meeting on Nov. 30, 2010, ACMA directors submitted letters to the Office of Advocacy 
asking the Office to get involved with the styrene listing.76  Staff at Advocacy quickly did as they 
were asked and forwarded ACMA’s letter to HHS on the same day.77  In its letter, ACMA claimed 
the NTP listing would jeopardize 500,000 jobs.  That figure represents more than 75 percent of all 
jobs SIRC identifies as styrene-related.   
When these efforts failed to block the listing, industry lobbyists asked for help in securing 
changes to the assessment procedures so that they could have more opportunities to influence the 
process, even though the industry trade associations and research groups had already commented 
extensively on NTP’s proposed listing.  The ACC launched a lobbying campaign to get Congress 
to change the procedures; SIRC actively lobbied in support of this effort.78 
No individual small business contacted Advocacy about the styrene listing.  The Office of 
Advocacy received correspondence about the styrene assessment only from SIRC and ACMA.  
Small businesses did not file comments on styrene with NTP independent of ACMA.79 
75  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010).  The e-mail includes an attachment describing ACMA’s 
actions related to the styrene listing and asks the Small Business Administration to: “Elevate this issue as a priority within the 
Office of Advocacy and assign a member of your staff to champion this effort; Contact the Office of Management and Budget 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OMB-OIRA) and request an interagency meeting with NTP to evaluate these 
claims; Submit a request to the Secretary of Health and Human Services Sebelius to postpone making her determination regarding 
styrene until the 13th RoC in order to implement the improvements to the process and to review all of the data for styrene before 
making a determination regarding the potential for carcinogenicity in keeping with other review processes.”  Cf.  Letter from 
Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Dec. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/hhs10_1201.pdf.
76  E-mail from Burleson Smith to David J. Rostker (Nov. 30, 2010) (sending a follow-up email from the meeting earlier that day 
with an attachment to an Information Quality Act Request for Corrections that SIRC submitted to HHS in October 2009); E-mail 
from Angie Castillo to David J. Rostker (Dec. 1, 2010) (attaching separate letters from Tom Dobbins and Monty Felix to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy).  
77  E-mail from Angie Castillo to David J. Rostker (Dec. 1, 2010) (attaching separate letters from Tom Dobbins and Monty Felix 
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy).  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, to Kathleen 
Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sba.
gov/sites/default/files/hhs10_1201.pdf.  Advocacy’s comment letter “encourage[s] NTP to consider all relevant scientific data in 
making its recommendations, including studies that show negative or null results” and to “carefully consider these concerns as the 
12th Report on Carcinogens is finalized and the preparations for the 13th report are begun.”  Id.  ACMA quickly thanked Advocacy 
for its help.  E-mail from Tom Dobbins to David J. Rostker (Dec. 2, 2010) (“Thanks to you, Dr. Sargeant and the rest of the team 
for the quick turnaround on this important letter.”).
78  Kate Sheppard, Republicans Attempt to Ax Program Monitoring Carcinogens, Mother Jones (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2012/08/republicans-attempt-ax-program-monitoring-carcinogens; Sarah Vogel, Hands 
off the Report on Carcinogens, Environmental Defense Fund (Sept. 5, 2012), http://blogs.edf.org/nanotechnology/2012/09/05/
hands-off-the-report-on-carcinogens/; Nicholas D. Kristof, The Cancer Lobby, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/10/07/opinion/sunday/kristof-the-cancer-lobby.html?_r=0; see also sources cited supra note 69.
79  Scientific Reviews for Listings in the 12th Report on Carcinogens: Public Comments, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.
nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=20A477F2-F1F6-975E-7472FC6B0DA56D9C#styrene (last updated July 19, 2012).
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Advocacy filed a second set of comments after the Report on Carcinogens was published 
and SIRC had filed its lawsuit challenging the styrene classification.  In its comments in 
November 2011, Advocacy criticized the NTP listing of styrene again, in the same letter it sent 
criticizing the formaldehyde listing, expressing concern about “the quality of [the Report on 
Carcinogens’] scientific analysis, the robustness of the scientific process, including procedures for 
peer review and public comment procedures, and that [the Report on Carcinogens] is duplicative 
of other federal chemical risk assessment programs, particularly the IRIS.”80  These comments 
repeated the talking points provided by ACMA and SIRC.81 
The Office of Advocacy became involved in the styrene issue in response to a request by 
the affected trade associations, which are dominated by big businesses or their lobbyists, and its 
comments repeated their arguments.  At a hearing on the Report on Carcinogens, held by the 
House Science Committee and Small Business Committee in April 2012, Advocacy staff admitted 
they made no effort to verify industry’s claims.82  After hearing the testimony, Rep. Brad Miller 
(D-NC) commented that the Office of Advocacy “relied for their scientific judgment and process 
comments on the information provided by Styrene lobbyists, so their testimony was really just an 
echo of what we heard from the Dow Chemical industry scientist.”83 
80  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of 
Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Nov. 22, 2011), http://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Advocacy_Comment_Letter-Report_On_Carcinogens.pdf; Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy, to Dr. Ruth Lunn, Director, Office 
of the Report on Carcinogens 4 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/NTP/RoC/Thirteenth/Process/PublicComm/
SBA20111214.pdf.  
81  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010).  This e-mail includes an attachment of an ACMA Issue 
Summary to be discussed at the meeting with Advocacy on Sept. 15, 2010.  The document identifies four major areas of concern: 
[1] The styrene listing will raise unnecessary concerns about the safety of styrene among employees and communities exposed 
to the chemical; [2] NTP’s position on styrene is inconsistent with a European report and a Blue Ribbon Panel report on styrene 
because NTP failed to adequately consider negative studies; [3] NTP’s review process causes concerns about the scientific quality 
and validity of its findings on styrene; and [4] Businesses that have participated in the NTP process have not been assured that 
their comments were considered during the review process.  These talking points were reiterated in a presentation by ACMA 
at Advocacy’s environmental roundtable on July 29th, 2011.  Advocacy’s letter on November 22, 2011 regarding styrene and 
formaldehyde mirror the talking points made in these two documents.  
82  Webcast, How the Report on Carcinogens Uses Science to Meet its Statutory Obligations, and its Impact on Small Business 
Jobs, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology and the 
Subcomm. on Healthcare and Technology of the H. Comm. on Small Business, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on Report on 
Carcinogens] (statement of Charles A. Maresca, Dir., Interagency Affairs, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin.), available at 
http://science.edgeboss.net/wmedia/science/sst2012/042512.wvx.
83  Press Release, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Minority, Subcommittee Misses Opportunity to Understand 
the Impact of National Toxicology Program’s Report on Carcinogens (Apr. 25, 2012), http://democrats.science.house.gov/press-
release/subcommittee-misses-opportunity-understand-impact-national-toxicology-program%E2%80%99s-report.  
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Chromium Battles
 Chromium is a naturally occurring heavy metal, found in two widely used classes of 
compounds: trivalent chromium (chromium-3) and the more carcinogenic hexavalent chromium 
(chromium-6).84  Hexavalent chromium is used for chrome plating, dyes and pigments, treating 
wood, and for producing steel and other alloys.85  Hexavalent chromium exposure can come from 
inhaling or ingesting the substance.  Inhalation of hexavalent chromium has long been recognized 
as a cancer risk to workers in the chromium industry.  In fact, hexavalent chromium has been 
listed as a “known human carcinogen” in NTP’s Report on Carcinogens since 1980,86 and the EPA 
IRIS database has calculated maximum limits for chromium inhalation since 1998.87  
OSHA began regulating worker exposure to chromium in 1971, after it adopted a 
consensus standard as a mandatory workplace limit.88  The National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health recommended OSHA improve its chromium-6 standard in 1975 to better 
protect workers,89 but no new OSHA standard was forthcoming.  In 1993, Public Citizen and the 
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers sued OSHA to compel it to set new exposure standards to 
reduce workers’ chromium cancer risk.90  
The Chrome Coalition, a trade association of chromium manufacturers, immediately 
hired consultants to publicize the findings from 18 studies on the health effects of hexavalent 
chromium it had commissioned; all found minimal cancer risks.91  Industry groups also urged 
OSHA to delay action until an EPA study on chromium’s cancer risk had been completed.  When 
the study showed cancer risks, industry interests urged further delays and more analysis.  
84  See generally Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Chromium, Nickel and Welding, 49
IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (1990), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/
ENG/Monographs/vol49/mono49.pdf.
85  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Toxicological 
Profile for Chromium 1–8 (2012), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp7.pdf.  
86  Notice, First Annual Report on Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,372 (Sept. 16, 1980); see also IARC, supra note 84 (explaining 
that hexavalent chromium was identified in the IARC monographs as a known human carcinogen in 1973, and supplementing the 
monograph with new evidence in support of the original classification). 
87  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Hexavalent Chromium (1998), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/iris/toxreviews/0144tr.pdf.
88  Air Contaminants, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 tbl. Z-1 (1999).  Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 146-
47, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26778 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2002) (explaining that OSHA’s 1971 standard for hexavalent chromium was 
based on a recommended standard by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1943.  ANSI’s standard followed from 
reports from the 1920’s about hexavalent chromium’s acute effects). 
89  Nat’l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Pub. No. 76-129, Criteria for a 
Recommended Standard: Occupational Exposure to Chromium (VI) (1975), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
docs/1970/76-129.html. 
90  Occupational Safety and Health Law § 13 (Randy S. Rabinowitz & Scott H. Durham eds., 2d ed. Supp. 2008).  OSHA 
had attempted to set a new standard for chromium-6 as part of a cumulative carcinogen standard in 1977, but the Supreme Court 
invalidated the OSHA rulemaking, finding that the agency must perform an individual risk assessment for each chemical standard 
it develops.  See David Michaels, Doubt is Their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your Health 
97–100 (2008).
91  Michaels, supra note 90, at 100–01; David Michaels et al., Commentary, Selected Science: An Industry Campaign to 
Undermine an OSHA Hexavalent Chromium Standard, Envtl. Health: A Global Access Sci. Source 2 (2006), available at http://
www.ehjournal.net/content/pdf/1476-069X-5-5.pdf.
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As the debate over the cancer risks of inhaling chromium-6 progressed, another battle 
opened up.  The movie Erin Brockovich, which premiered in 2000, described the struggle of 
residents of Hinkley, CA, to get compensation from Pacific Gas & Electric after it contaminated 
the town’s drinking water with chromium, making many residents ill.  The case settled for $333 
million in 1993, making it the largest class-action in U.S. history at the time.92  
By 2010, an NTP study showed that ingestion of drinking water contaminated with 
hexavalent chromium caused cancer in laboratory animals,93 and staff at EPA believed there 
was enough information to calculate a reference concentration (maximum exposure level) for 
chromium ingestion.  If EPA was able to do this, new drinking water standards for chromium 
levels nationwide would likely follow.
Industry objected,94 arguing that chromium is metabolized by humans into a less toxic 
form of the metal, thus posing minimal cancer risk from drinking water.  Their “evidence” was 
a 1997 re-analysis (shown to be fraudulent in 200595) of a 1987 Chinese study.96  The American 
Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium Panel, the apparent successor to the Chrome 
Coalition, led the objections, urging EPA to delay its IRIS assessment until an industry-funded 
study had been completed.97  Since October 2010, the American Chemistry Council has filed 25 
separate comments objecting to the IRIS assessment of hexavalent chromium – almost half of 
the total number of comments filed.98  EPA bowed to industry pressure and agreed to indefinitely 
delay its IRIS assessment.99 
92  Sedina Banks, The “Erin Brockovich Effect”: How Media Shapes Toxics Policy, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 219, 230 
(2003).  In 2003, Honeywell International, Inc., was ordered to pay $400 million for cleanup of chromium in New Jersey.  Rebecca 
Sutton, Environmental Working Group, Chromium-6 in U.S. Tap Water 17 (2010), available at http://static.ewg.org/
reports/2010/chrome6/chrome6_report_2.pdf.  A similar class action suit was filed against Honeywell & PPG Industries in 2010.  
Smith v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-03345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51854 (D.N.J. May 13, 2011).
93  Nat’l Toxicology Program, NTP TR 546, Technical Report on the Toxicology and Carcinogenesis Studies of 
Sodium Dichromate Dihydrate (CAS No. 7789-12-0) in F344/N Rats and B6C3F1 Mice (Drinking Water Studies) (July 
2008), http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/LT_rpts/tr546.pdf; Press Release, Nat’l Institute of Health, Hexavalent Chromium in 
Drinking Water Causes Cancer in Lab Animals (May 16, 2007), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/may2007/niehs-16.htm.  
94  See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, Draft Toxicological Review of Chromium: 
In Support of Summary Information on the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;D=EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
95  Id.  As a result of the fraudulent study, the Journal pulled it from publication and issued a letter regarding the incident.  P. 
Brandt-Rauf, Editorial Retraction, Cancer Mortality in a Chinese Population Exposed to Hexavalent Chromium in Water, 48(7) J. 
Occupational & Envtl. Medicine 749 (2006).
96  See Environmental Working Group, Chrome-Plated Fraud: How PG&E’s Scientists-For-Hire Reversed Findings 
of Cancer Study (2005), http://www.ewg.org/book/export/html/8626.  
97  Letter from Ann Mason, Senior Director, Am. Chemistry Council, to Rebecca Clark, Acting Director, Nat’l Ctr. 
for Envtl. Assessment, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540-0027 (select the pdf icon by “view attachment” to download the attached 
file).  American Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium Panel funded this new, $4 million study, which was conducted by 
Tox Strategies and a team of scientists with ties to industry.  According to ACC’s website, “The panel’s primary activities include 
sponsoring research to fill the scientific database informing the risk levels for hexavalent chromium in drinking water and 
communicating the findings of this research.”  Hexavalent Chromium, AmericanChemistry.com, http://www.americanchemistry.
com/HexavalentChromium.  ACC also began a letter writing campaign from industry organizations to EPA asking the agency 
to delay its assessment until the new industry study is complete.  See, e.g., E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg 
(Sept. 15, 2011) (attaching several letters from trade associations all asking EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to postpone the IRIS 
assessment of chromium until ACC completes its ongoing research project and EPA has had an opportunity to consider the data).
98  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, supra note 94.
99  IRISTrack Detailed Report: Chromium VI Assessment Milestones and Dates, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, http://cfpub.epa.
gov/ncea/iristrac/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewChemical.showChemical&sw_id=1114 (last updated Jan. 8, 2013).
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Advocacy Involvement
The Office of Advocacy became involved in the debate about the cancer risks of ingesting 
chromium after being contacted by the same ACC lobbyist who had urged Advocacy to become 
involved in the debate about formaldehyde risks.100  In June 2011, the lobbyist suggested Advocacy 
staff write a letter to EPA asking that it delay completion of the chromium assessment until after 
the ACC study had been completed.101  The request did not mention any small business concerns.
Advocacy did not attempt to research or validate the ACC’s position on chromium.  Staff 
at the Office of Advocacy did ask if there was evidence showing a link between chromium-laced 
drinking water and cancer and was assured that new industry-funded research would answer 
these questions.102  This apparently satisfied Advocacy staff.103 
Staff at the Office of Advocacy also asked if any small businesses were affected by the 
chromium risk assessment.  ACC assured Advocacy that they were, and Advocacy staff asked 
no more questions.104  No small business contacted the Office of Advocacy to challenge the IRIS 
chromium assessment.  A few small businesses filed comments with EPA on the IRIS chromium 
assessment, echoing the comments already filed by ACC asking EPA to delay the IRIS assessment 
until after completion of ACC’s new study. 
On Oct. 5, 2011, Advocacy submitted a letter to EPA expressing the concerns of “small 
business representatives” over EPA’s IRIS evaluation that hexavalent chromium is carcinogenic.105  
The Office of Advocacy went on to claim that EPA did not have sufficient data to estimate the 
risk from ingestion of chromium and argued that EPA should not rely on a linear model to 
estimate the cancer risks of exposure to low doses of chromium.  The Office asked EPA to delay 
its final assessment until a new industry study was completed and its results incorporated into the 
assessment.  
100  E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Bruce E. Lundegrun (Feb. 3, 2011) (“May I impose on you to help arrange a meeting 
with your Advocacy Office colleagues who handle environmental issues?  The Senate EPW Committee held a hearing on drinking 
water contaminants yesterday at which Administrator Jackson testified.  My interest in setting up the meeting has been raised 
substantially as a result of her testimony.  As you may recall, I represent the American Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium 
Panel, and Cr6 was one of the topics of the hearing.”).
101  E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg (June 28, 2011) (“I would like you to be aware EPA’s Cr6 risk 
assessment is moving forward apparently without waiting for ACC’s MOA and PK studies to be completed and accepted 
for publication, notwithstanding the agency’s own peer reviewers strong recommendation.  NFIB recently sent a letter to 
Administrator Jackson calling upon her to stop the Cr6 risk assessment process to do exactly as EPA’s peer reviewers deemed 
advisable. . . .Since it appears EPA needs to hear from more constituents for it to listen to its own peer review team, would SBA be 
willing to send a letter to Ms. Jackson to weigh in on this matter?”).
102  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Jeff Hannapel, Steve Via, and Randy Schumacher (Feb. 25, 2011) (“Birnbaum told the 
committee that studies, other than EWG, have found a ‘statistically significant association between hexavalent chromium in 
drinking water and cancer.’  Does anyone have these studies , or the references to these studies?”); E-mail from Randy Schumacher 
to Kevin L. Bromberg (Feb. 25, 2011) (“ACC’s research is examining why this occurs and whether Cr6 at low doses (consistent 
with existing drinking water standards) has the same carcinogenic effects and mode if [sic] action. . . .”).
103  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Randy Schumacher (Feb. 25, 2011) (“thx.”) (responding to chain of e-mails on the 
association between hexavalent chromium in drinking water and cancer).
104  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Ann Mason and Randal Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Since this is the oral ingestion 
standard, is this toxicological review even relevant to platers, like NAMF?  Isn’t that only inhalation risk – and a separate risk 
assessment, that I believe is under development?  Isn’t this review solely of interest to drinking water suppliers?”).  Reply e-mail 
from Ann Mason to Kevin L. Bromberg and Randal Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Yes the oral tox review will impact drinking 
water systems AND will impact all cleanup and possible effluent standards.  So the industries interested in the Cr6 oral tox review 
include all of the Cr6 user industries, including all industries that do plating or use chromium.”).  
105  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office 
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The ACC lobbyist provided the Office of Advocacy with these talking points and edited its 
draft letter to EPA.106  Advocacy’s final letter to EPA precisely mirrors the text forwarded to it by 
the ACC and is remarkably similar to ACC’s comments to EPA.107
of Advocacy, to Paul Anastas, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/
advocacy/816/27201. 
106  See E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg (Sept. 15, 2011) (attaching several letters from trade associations 
all asking EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to postpone the IRIS assessment of chromium until ACC completes its ongoing 
research project and EPA has had an opportunity to consider the data); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Ann Mason and Randy 
Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Ann, Randy – a question on Cr 6:  ‘Initial results show that Cr(VI) is not mutagenic at low [ ] and 
that the human stomach has a substantial ability to reduce Cr(VI) to the benign chromium-3.  Confirmation of a threshold would 
mean that there is no cancer risk at low doses, contrary to the current EPA model.’  Would you edit these sentences – or is this 
accurate?”); E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Ann Mason (Oct. 3, 2011) (providing his suggested edits to Kevin Bromberg’s 
text); E-mail from Ann Mason to Randal Schumacher and Kevin L. Bromberg (Oct. 3, 2011) (“This text is ok with me as edited 
by Randy.  Note that some of the EPA peer reviewers were particularly emphatic about this point.  Kevin, did you want/need to 
include a quote from them?”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Randal Schumacher and Ann Mason (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Can you 
get some good quotes from scientists not named in the NRDC letter?  Also, is there a good argument about the gastric issue that 
you could offer?”).  
107  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office 
of Advocacy, to Paul Anastas, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/
advocacy/816/27201; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, supra note 94.
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4. Did the Office of Advocacy’s Actions Really Serve the 
Interests of Small Businesses?
Like most Americans, we 
believe a vibrant small business 
sector supports a more resilient 
economy.  The assistance the 
Small Business Administration 
provides to small business owners 
is an important public service, 
increasingly so when markets are 
dominated by large corporations.  
The mission of the Office of 
Advocacy is to ensure that other 
federal agencies consider small 
business concerns.  
However, this investigation reveals that, rather than aligning its mission with the work 
of other federal agencies, the Office of Advocacy actually worked with large business interests to 
obstruct and delay the work of at least two agencies tasked with protecting the health and safety 
of the American people.  One part of government should not be working to undermine the efforts 
of another.
The correspondence into and out of the Office of Advocacy that we have examined 
paints a picture of a federal agency extremely responsive to the agenda of trade associations 
dominated by big chemical manufacturers and their lobbyists.  No small business asked the Office 
of Advocacy to intervene with the NTP Report on Carcinogens or the EPA IRIS assessments of 
cancer risks.  Advocacy’s comments on these assessments offered no small business perspective to 
NTP or IRIS.  No small business filed an independent comment critical of the formaldehyde and 
styrene assessments; a few small businesses did comment on the chromium assessment.  In each 
case, the Office of Advocacy made no attempt to determine whether the views of the American 
Chemistry Council, the American Composite Manufacturers Association, or the Formaldehyde 
Council actually represented the views or interests of small businesses.  
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The Office of Advocacy’s close coordination of its efforts with lobbyists seeking legislation 
to obtain the same results suggests its staff engaged in impermissible lobbying.  Advocacy’s efforts 
to block the NTP and IRIS assessments were initiated by the American Chemistry Council and 
groups or lobbyists associated with it.  ACC is made up of 140 chemical companies; it claims that 
70 of its members are “small and medium sized businesses” but doesn’t specify what it means 
by “small” or “medium.”  Its membership is dominated by the largest chemical companies in the 
country, including Dow, DuPont, Exxon Mobil, Georgia-Pacific, and more.  Its federal lobbying 
expenditures in the fourth quarter of 2011 were the fifth highest of any group filing lobbying 
reports.  Its Formaldehyde Panel is funded by Georgia-Pacific and Hexion, both large companies.  
Dow is a major player in both ACC and the Styrene Information and Research Council.  ACC’s 
Chromium Panel succeeded the Chrome Coalition.  There is no evidence of any small business 
role in any of the ACC coalitions.
This is not surprising since small businesses do not share the anti-regulatory views of large 
chemical companies.  A survey by the American Sustainable Business Council concluded that: 
Organizations like the American Chemistry Council have made anti-
regulation legislation in Congress and state legislatures a top priority, 
pushing the myth that all regulations are a threat to small business growth 
. . . .  But the reality is that small business owners see the value of sound 
regulations to help guide the market to deliver innovation for safer 
chemicals and products, which consumers are demanding. This data shows 
that no matter what your political affiliation is, there is agreement that 
toxic chemicals need to be regulated to prevent risk for business and the 
public.108    
Even the Office of Advocacy’s own research shows that challenging cancer assessments is 
simply not a priority of actual small business owners.  According to an initiative to identify the 
interest of small business (referred to as the r3 initiative109),  the top regulatory issues of concern 
to small business related to their ability to compete against large businesses for government 
contracts; EPA rules, particularly its “Once in, Always in” policy,110 were also a concern.  
Advocacy received no nominations related to scientific assessments.111 
108  Toxic Chemical Reform Good for Business—New Poll, American Sustainable Business Council (ASBC) (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://asbcouncil.org/node/845. 
109  Small Business Regulatory Review and Reform Initiative, SBA Office of Advocacy, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/.  The r3 
Initiative began under Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Tom Sullivan, but did not continue after he resigned in 2008.  The initiative 
was designed to allow small businesses to nominate rules for review, which Advocacy would then review and publish as a top ten 
list in its annual RFA report.  Post Hearing Questions and Answers for the Record Submitted to Sen. Olympia Snowe by Winslow 
Sargeant, Jan.25, 2011 (Next Steps for Main Street: Reducing the Regulatory and Administrative Burdens on America’s Small 
Businesses: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (Nov. 18, 2010)), available at http://
www.sba.gov/advocacy/2675/14163; see also New Small Business Program Will Influence Agency Regulatory Reviews, OMB Watch 
(Sept. 11, 2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3419.
110  See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Potential to Emit for MACT Standards -- Guidance on Timing 
Issues (May 16, 1995) for an explanation of the Once in, Always in air quality policy, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/caaa/t3/memoranda/
pteguid.pdf. 
111  Regulatory Review and Reform (r3) Top 10 Rules, 2008 in Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2007:  Annual 
Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive 
Order 13272, at Appx. B (2008), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/07regflx.pdf; Regulatory Review and 
Reform (r3) Top 10 Rules, 2009, SBA Office of Advocacy, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/r3_nominations09.html#10.  Although 
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Moreover, testimony at a recent joint hearing of the House Science Committee and 
Small Business Committee112 suggests that small businesses may in fact benefit from stricter 
regulation of some toxic substances, because the prohibition of some chemicals may open up new 
markets for those who manufacture “green” substitutes.  The Vice President of BioAmber, Ally 
Latourelle, stated in her testimony that “recognition that styrene is ‘reasonably anticipated’ to be 
carcinogenic is not detrimental to our small business.  In fact, for our business, as an alternative 
to petrochemicals, and the developers of non-toxic styrene replacement products, reports 
published by government on the toxicology of chemicals and regulations of those chemicals is 
a driver to our business as well as our strategic partners in the area of chemical production and 
manufacturing.”113  Apparently, the Office of Advocacy never inquired about these issues. 
Advocacy’s website indicated that it was accepting nominations until December 31, 2010 for its 2011 r3 initiative, the r3 Top Ten 
list has not been published in the RFA since 2009.
112  Hearing on Report on Carcinogens, supra note 82 (statement of Ally Latourelle, Vice President, Gov’t Affairs, BioAmber, 
Inc.).
113  Id. 
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5. Conclusions
The Regulatory Flexibility Act assigns to the Office of Advocacy responsibility for 
ensuring that federal agencies evaluate the impacts on small businesses of the rules they adopt.  
Cancer risk assessments are not covered by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.  They do not regulate 
small business.  The Office of Advocacy had no reasonable basis for becoming involved in the 
NTP or IRIS assessments. 
The Office of Advocacy’s decision to comment on technical, scientific assessments 
represents a significant and unwarranted expansion of its role and extends its reach well beyond 
the regulatory process.  By its own admission, Advocacy lacks the scientific expertise to evaluate 
the merits of the NTP/IRIS assessments.  Advocacy’s comments on these assessments raised 
no issues of specific concern to small business but relied almost exclusively on talking points 
provided by trade associations engaged in major lobbying campaigns. 
Between 2005 and 2012, the American Chemistry Council and its members spent more 
than $333 million lobbying Congress and federal agencies.114  The Formaldehyde Institute/
Council, Styrene Industry Research Council, and Chrome Coalition spent millions of dollars in a 
protracted lobbying campaign to prevent government agencies from designating these substances 
as carcinogenic and tens of millions more on research carefully designed to support their claims 
that these substances do not cause cancer in humans.  These groups asked the Office of Advocacy 
for assistance, and the Office became a willing partner in these lobbying efforts.
The Office of Advocacy’s efforts to block the NTP and IRIS assessments came amid 
efforts by the ACC to win congressional approval of legislation overhauling the NTP and IRIS 
assessment processes.   Both ACC and Dow Chemical lobbied Congress to delay publication 
of the Report on Carcinogens until the National Academy of Sciences conducted yet another 
review.115  Rep. Denny Rehberg (R-MT) unsuccessfully pushed an appropriations rider to do just 
that.116 
Besides the moral and ethical concerns raised by efforts to keep substances known 
to cause cancer on the market and in wide use, the activities of the Office of Advocacy are 
disturbing because they may be illegal.  Civil and criminal laws bar federal employees from 
lobbying.  While the Government Accountability Office admits that lobbying restrictions are 
“unclear and imprecise,” the Comptroller General has said anti-lobbying laws prohibit providing 
“administrative support for teh [sic] lobbying activities of private organizations.”117 
114  Jeremy P. Jacobs, Industry Group Boosted Political Spending Last Year – And it Paid Off, E&E Daily (Feb. 7, 2012), http://
www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2012/02/07/1.
115  See Sass, supra note 47.
116  Committee on Appropriations, supra note 48.
117  U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/T-OGC-96-18, Testimony Before the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives:  H.R. 3078, The Federal Agency Anti-Lobbying Act; Statement of 
Robert P. Murphy, General Counsel, General Accounting Office (1996), available at http://gao.justia.com/department-
of-the-interior/1996/5/h-r-3078-the-federal-agency-anti-lobbying-act-t-ogc-96-18/T-OGC-96-18-full-report.pdf; Lobbying and 
Publicity or Propaganda Guidelines: Appropriations Act Riders, Nat’l Institute Of Health Ethics Program, http://ethics.od.nih.gov/
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Our investigation raises serious questions about the lack of oversight of the Office of 
Advocacy’s actions.  The Office’s activities are not reviewed by the administrator of the Small 
Business Administration or the White House.  Congress has conducted no oversight hearings on 
the Office in more than 25 years, and GAO has not investigated the Office’s activities. 
Specific Findings and Recommendations
The Office of Advocacy submitted comments regarding three widely used chemicals, objecting 
to cancer assessments by the National Toxicology Program and the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System, even though no federal regulation was at stake.  
These actions were not authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and improperly expanded the 
Office of Advocacy’s jurisdiction into areas in which it has no expertise. 
	Recommendation:  The Office of Advocacy should limit its work to regulatory activities 
affecting small business, as authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent laws.
The Office of Advocacy hosts regular Environmental Roundtables attended by trade association 
representatives and lobbyists.  The discussions and minutes are kept secret, although the 
consensus positions that emerge appear to inform the Office of Advocacy’s policy positions.  
These meetings violate the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  
	Recommendation:  Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the Office of Advocacy’s 
Environmental Roundtables violate Federal Advisory Committee Act provisions.
The Office of Advocacy staff made no effort to educate themselves on the science underlying 
the debates about the cancer risks of these chemicals or to verify the accuracy of the talking 
points provided to them by industry lobbyists before filing comments critical of the NTP/IRIS 
processes and the scientific conclusions in each assessment.118  Instead, the Office of Advocacy 
simply repackaged and submitted talking points provided by trade association lobbyists as formal 
comments. 
	Recommendation:  The Office of Advocacy should independently verify the factual claims 
it makes in comments to other federal agencies and should not comment on technical or 
scientific matters on which its staff have no expertise.  
topics/Lobby-Publicity-Guide.htm#Footnote (last updated Feb. 18, 2011).  A 2009 investigation condemned the activities of a 
small unit inside the Department of Interior where communication between government staff and external parties “created the 
potential for conflicts of interest or violations of law.” Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah) who had called for the investigation responded: 
“The ongoing, explicit, far-reaching coordination between special interest lobbying groups and [government staff] . . . is troubling 
. . . . This inappropriate meddling of private and public lobbying efforts is precisely the sort of thing I warned against . . . .”  Bruce 
Hosking, Role of BLM Employees Questioned in Federal Investigation, Examiner.com (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/
article/role-of-blm-employees-questioned-federal-investigation. 
118  In each of these cases (formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium), other federal agencies like OSHA, NIOSH, ATSDR also 
extensively reviewed their cancer risks.  The Office of Advocacy made no effort to even compare the NTP or IRIS assessments to 
the work of other federal agencies.
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Correspondence between the Office of Advocacy and trade associations dominated by large 
chemical companies and their lobbyists suggests the Office became entangled in a major lobbying 
campaign to prevent the federal government from listing certain chemicals as known or probable 
carcinogens.  E-mails suggest the Office of Advocacy may have violated the Anti-Lobbying Act 
and other lobbying restrictions.  
	Recommendation:  Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the activities of the 
Office of Advocacy represent impermissible lobbying by federal employees. 
No small businesses objected to the scientific assessments or asked the Office of Advocacy 
to intervene in the cancer assessments.  The Office of Advocacy made no effort to determine 
whether the positions it took represented small business views and interests.  Moreover, since 
small businesses may produce substitutes for toxic chemicals, a cancer finding for existing 
chemicals could open up new markets for substitute chemicals produced by small businesses.  
	Recommendation: The Office of Advocacy should develop procedures to verify that its 
policies represent the interests of small business.  Its comments should be limited to offering a 
small business perspective that the regulating agency would not otherwise hear. 
No process or procedures seem to be in place to ensure that the activities of the Office of 
Advocacy are consistent with, and do not work to undermine, the statutory responsibilities of 
other agencies.  
	Recommendation:  Congress should exert more rigorous oversight over the Office of 
Advocacy to ensure its work does not delay or prevent other federal agencies from fulfilling 
their statutory goals, especially those scientific and regulatory agencies tasked with protecting 
the health of the American people.
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